FALMLEN

Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



PB-80-89-1 Winter 1989 Vol. 2, No. 1

From the Commandant

Water covers most of the earth's surface; it's only logical that waterborne infiltration and exfiltration be an important part of the mission of special operations forces, which are designed to operate anywhere in the world.

Despite that fact, the only standardized SOF waterborne operations training has been for underwater operations (UWO), and while diving is an important capability, it represents a small part of the waterborne mission -- small in terms of both probability and requirements, yet costly in terms of training time and funding. Scarce UWO delivery vehicles coupled with inherent limitations of the diving equipment (which severely restrict the time a diver can spend underwater) make diving the least effective of the infiltration/exfiltration methods and the least likely to be used. Diving equipment is highly technical and requires a great deal of support structure and maintenance. The highly perishable skills of the divers themselves take an inordinate amount of training time to maintain, and keeping divers trained to the required standards leaves little time to train them in other necessary skills.

On the other hand, the availability and versatility of surface means offer numerous options which are pragmatic solutions to meeting our requirements. Since we have never had standardized training in surface waterborne operations, units have been forced to develop their own training strategies, with the result that different units were training for different tasks with varying standards.

This year the Special Warfare Center and School will begin running the first regular classes of the Waterborne Infiltration Course, a training program designed to prepare special operations forces for their surface waterborne missions. The course will provide students an introduction to navigation, marine hazards, planning procedures, surface swimming, and the use of various surface craft and support vessels. It will also allow them to put all their training to use in a field training exercise.

By providing a standardized training base, the Waterborne Infiltration Course will ensure that soldiers have a common basis on which units can develop their mission-specific training. In providing training for the most likely infiltration and exfiltration methods, the course will improve the readiness of our special operations forces.

Along with training, the Center and School has recently developed a new training circular, TC 31-25, *Special Forces Waterborne Operations*, which replaces the older FM 31-25. The older manual was based on Navy diving manuals and failed to incorporate surface waterborne operations. The new manual deals with all the forms of waterborne operations -- diving, rubber-boat and kayak operations, and surface swimming -- and their various applications. With the distribution of this manual to field units, surface waterborne operations have officially become part of our waterborne doctrine.

Our commitment to the waterborne mission does not stop with training and doctrinal publications. The Center and School's Directorate of Combat Developments is working on various equipment projects to make all types of waterborne operations more effective. To meet the demands of our training strategy, we have plans to improve our waterborne training facility near Key West, Fla., to improve training in our diving courses and to accommodate the new Waterborne Infiltration Course.

Training such as the Waterborne Infiltration Course is the result of a study of our current missions and ones we are likely to encounter in the future. This same kind of study goes into other articles in this issue which analyze current and historical military operations from the Civil War, World War II, the recent Iran-Iraq War and on-going insurgencies to produce lessons for all special operations forces.

By examining our special operations missions we are working to meet the needs for all special operations forces both now and in the future. It is a formidable challenge that requires our constant attention and complete commitment to designing the finest force possible.



Brig. Gen. David J. Baratto

Winter 1989 Special Warfare Vol. 2, No. 1

Contents

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special operations forces by providing an open forum for the open examination of both established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, and should be addressed to: Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: AUTOVON 239-5703 or commercial (919) 432-5703.

Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to *Special Warfare* and the author.

Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special operations units. Individuals desiring a private subscription should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Carl E. Vuono
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:
William J. Meehan II
Brigadier General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

Features

Departments

The cover: Soldiers paddle kayaks, a form of waterborne infiltration used in World War II and still valid today. The SWCS's new Waterborne Infiltration Course will teach the use of kayaks and other vehicles in performing a variety of waterborne missions. (See story on Pg. 5)

Letters

Special Warfare

CMF history

I have enjoyed the second issue of Special Warfare as fully as I did the first. You have a good product with a good mixture of input on special operations, Civil Affairs and PSYOP, garnished with good historical pieces.

There is one minor cavil I would like to make on the contents of the second issue, however. In Sergeant Major Carter's piece on CMF 18 there are some errors concerning the history of the CMF. It is my suspicion that the author was working from some incomplete files and therefore did not have all the history available to him. (The ARs requiring frequent culling of files may save us from paper inundation, but they are hard on history.) The effort to create the CMF (and the officers' SC and the WO program) began a full year or more before the 1982 period cited by your author. The march of events was as follows:

April 1981: Maj. Gen. Vaught had a conversation with Gen. Meyer (then CSA) on the need for some personnel programs to support special operations. MILPERCEN was asked for a proposal.

19 May 1981: Memo from Maj. Gen. Vaught to CSA through the DCSOPS (Lt. Gen. Otis) saying that the MILPERCEN proposal was inadequate and recommending a study be made of the subject and that Col. Charlie Beckwith (then with JSOC) be designated to conduct the study.

26 June–17 August 1981: Col. Beckwith and one other officer conducted study.

18 August 1981: Study briefed to CSA, who authorized continued effort, briefing of Army Staff and MILPERCEN.

1 September 1981: Col. Beckwith went on terminal leave, retiring on 1 October.

September 1981–August 1982: Repeated briefings of DCSPER, briefings of other Army Staff, of MILPERCEN divisions, and of SO units. (Low point of the period was a message from USAJFKCMA/IMA commander/commandant to a number of senior general officers to the effect that the "18" proposals were not supported by those organizations. Fortunately, this message was later recalled.)

September 1982: DCSPER (Lt. Gen. Thurman) and DCSOPS (Lt. Gen. Richardson) signed memo approving the "18" proposals.

October 1982–May 1983: DCSPER implementing group with membership from MILPERCEN divisions, SF organizations and a number of Army commands held meetings approximately monthly to work out the details of implementation.

Ergo, the effort to achieve the personnel changes necessary to support Special Forces took a bit longer than it would appear in your article.

A last final carp: it was done during Gen. Meyer's tour as CSA, not Gen. Wickham's, though some of the implementation undoubtedly took place during the latter officer's watch.

J.H. Crerar
COL (USA, Retired)
Vienna, Va.

(The enlisted CMF was implemented while Gen. Meyer was Army Chief of Staff, but the Special Forces Branch for officers was implemented during Gen. John A. Wickham's tenure as chief of staff.

The Special Operations Proponency Office has done some further research on the history of the CMF and confirms Col. Crerar's timetable, adding that the "other officer" assigned to the study, rightly one of the fathers of the SF Branch, was Col. Crerar himself. --Editor)

Lost knowledge

A few years ago, I began research for material concerning unconventional warfare and foreign-internal-defense base camps. The purpose of this research was to obtain material to develop a detailed class on this subject of 18-series instruction.

In the course of this research, I came to a disheartening discovery. Text and reports such as "lessons learned" and "after-action reports" are nearly impossible to locate. After nearly 200 hours of research, I finally gathered enough material to meet my needs. But it appears to me that nearly everything about Vietnam, or even remotely related to it, has been lost or dropped into some bottomless pit. I also found that a number of people are of the opinion that there is nothing about Vietnam that impacts on today's missions.

There is a real need for a classified depository within the special operations community where copies of classified area studies and after-action reports could be filed by region and subject. Perhaps a second section could contain declassified or unclassified reports. If something like this does exist, it is perhaps a better-kept secret that the Manhattan Project of World War II. A depository would certainly be of great value to detachments preparing for an operation, to planners at higher echelons, and to the instructors at the Special Warfare Center and School.

At present, when an operational detachment or a mobile training team goes to a region, its members usually, though not always, prepare an after-action report upon their return. This report then goes up the chain to some level where interest is lost, and it gets filed. Filed where? This depends on the level at which it stopped. What about the next group to travel into that region six months or a year later? Subsequent teams may not know that other teams have been there before. Therefore, they have to start from scratch, making contacts, learning who they can trust or depend on, and locating where the real problems or sensitive areas of a region are. A central depository for these reports would prevent duplication of effort in those areas and many others.

Concerning the apparent lack of interest toward Vietnam by some people, I feel that there is a great deal to be learned from Vietnam by studying both sides of the conflict. Speaking of the "other side," communist guerrilla tactics basically have not changed, nor will they. From small-unit operations to base-camp principles, the biggest changes are generally refinements to counter better intelligence-gathering techniques and weapons pitted against them. Additionally, studies show definite similarities between Central and South American communist guerrillas and Viet Cong methods.

To find this similarity, one must determine the level of development in the region of interest and then compare this level to a similar one reached by the VC. Once this is done, you need only to look at the phases each went through to achieve that same level, and you will see how similar they are.

Knowledge is the key to success. However, this knowledge must be available to those who need it. The best knowledge is what we learn from our own efforts, and what we learn from the experience of others. We should not say that because something is bad or unpleasant we cannot or should not learn from it.

We should make every effort to share among ourselves the knowledge gained by first-hand experience. Much of that experience is lost because many warhorses of yesterday are now retiring. Without a written account of their experiences, their knowledge will be lost.

SFC Ronald W. Johnson
C Co., 3/5th SF Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.

(According to Dr. Stanley Sandler, historian for the JFK Center and School, the SWCS does have plans to develop an archive which will contain copies of after-action reports done by Special Forces units as well as records of the SWCS.

In the meantime, researchers will have to pursue several sources, including the SWCS's Security Assistance Training Management Office, which keeps after-action reports of its own MTTs; the Army Center for Military History; the Military History Institute; and the National Archives, which has a special Vietnam Records Project. --Editor)

Give medics credit

The article in your first issue by Brig. Gen. Guest dealing with overall Special Forces training concentrated on the similarities between all the 18 Career Management Field MOS training and therefore skipped over some important differences in the 18D track.

After Phase I and before the 60-day Phase II (the med lab phase is really Phase IIB) fall ten weeks of 91A training and 21 weeks of Phase IIA (the old 300 F-1 Course plus hospital training) at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and selected hospitals. Students are assigned to Company F (Abn.), 3rd Battalion, Academy of Health Sciences, the Special Forces training company here. The combined Phase IIA and IIB is 160 days as compared to the normal 60-day Phase II.

The officers and men of the Special Operations Forces Division and Company F (Abn.) are all an integral part of the Special Forces Qualification Course for the 18D and continue to make the 18D MOS training the longest, hardest and best training in the 18 CMF.

Warner D. Farr
Major, MC
Commander, Co. F and Chief, Special Operations Forces Division
Academy of Health Sciences

Special Warfare *welcomes letters from its readers but may have to edit them for length. Please include your full name, rank, phone number (AUTOVON, if possible) and address. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; USAJFKSWCS; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.*

Water covers most of the earth. To be ready to accomplish their missions, special operations forces must be skilled in all types of waterborne infiltration.



Waterborne Operations

New Training for an Old Mission

by Capt. Patrick Desmond

An A-detachment embarks from a friendly location aboard a fast-attack nuclear submarine. Eighty nautical miles from the detachment's objective, the submarine surfaces for 15 minutes and the team launches three motorized rubber boats. In these rubber boats, the detachment navigates 80 miles of open ocean to a safe position off its beach landing site. Scout swimmers from the detachment swim to the landing site, recon and secure an assembly area and signal the detachment forward. After landing quietly on the beach, the detachment caches its equipment and supplies and moves out to execute its inland mission.

Although the preceding scenario may seem irregular, it is not. It is typical of what all special operations units should be capable of -- infiltration by sea. Since the majority of the earth's surface (more than five-eighths) is covered with water, nearly all special operations units must be able to infiltrate all types of enemy coastlines in order to execute their missions, including unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance and operations in support of conventional forces. Equally critical, the detachments must be able to exfiltrate by sea and link up with friendly forces.

Waterborne operations, because of their complex and unusual nature, are typically joint-service operations which require an extensive amount of interservice coordination and a great deal of both operational and logistical support. The unit's pre-mission training must also be extensive -- the open ocean is the least forgiving of all environments.

In October, the Waterborne Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Special Operations Advanced Skills Department will begin regular classes in an innovative training program. The Waterborne Infiltration Course is specifically designed to meet the demands of units faced with real-world waterborne missions. The six-week course will cover the spectrum of surface waterborne operations to better prepare soldiers and increase the operational readiness of all special operations units.

Need for the Course

Waterborne missions will, under most circumstances, be accomplished by one of three methods: underwater swimming, surface swimming or employment of small boats.

"...the greatest problem with combat diving as a means of infiltration is the fact that the underwater breathing apparatus will allow divers to infiltrate only a very short distance underwater."

Each is effective, with distinct advantages and disadvantages, and real-world waterborne missions will often demand that they be used in combination.

Of the three methods, underwater operations are the most complex and difficult. They depend upon sophisticated operational and support apparatus that must be flawlessly maintained. Combat divers must also devote a tremendous amount of training time to both individual and collective underwater operations skills to maintain even an elementary proficiency. Indeed, the maintenance of diving skills in the special operations community has long represented an almost insurmountable obstacle, since diving is but one of the many skills in which team members must remain proficient.

At a minimum, combat divers must make monthly proficiency swims and requalify semi-annually in all diving skills. Key personnel such as dive supervisors and dive medical technicians must remain active in diving and attend periodic refresher seminars. But the greatest problem with combat diving as a means of infiltration is the fact that the underwater breathing apparatus will allow divers to infiltrate only a very short distance underwater. When using traditional open-circuit equipment, a team can swim no more than 2,000 meters subsurface. Even with the more efficient closed-circuit systems, an infiltrating

Photo by Al Petersen

The kayak has a low radar signature and has proven itself an excellent infiltration vehicle. Students will learn to make kayak "paddles" up to 30 nautical miles long.

Photo by Al Petersen

Soldiers in the Waterborne Infiltration Course will learn to conduct rubber-boat transits from 10 to 80 nautical miles.

team is limited under ideal conditions to a maximum of 4,000-5,000 meters of subsurface swimming. These are extremely limiting factors, and in all likelihood, the majority of waterborne missions will require surface swimming or small-boat operations.

The Waterborne Infiltration Course will focus on long-distance "over-the-horizon" surface infiltrations and exfiltrations, with detailed instruction in operational planning considerations, surface swimming, and rubber-boat and kayak operations. Emphasis will also be placed on the coordination for and the use of all available intermediate delivery systems: aircraft, surface vessels and submarines.

"Over-the-horizon" refers to that distance from the coastline that will provide the infiltrating detachment with the highest degree of safety from detection or observation on its insertion. If an objective beach landing site has no early-warning systems other than sentry observation from the beach, a detachment in a small boat may be safe from observation from as close as two nautical miles offshore. Normally, however, coastal radar systems can be expected to be prominent, in which case the safe distance, the over-the-horizon distance, is dependent upon the height of the radar. The higher the radar, the greater the radar tangent, and the farther away the infiltrating detachment must be inserted to avoid observation. The type and height of the intermediate delivery system will also be a critical factor in determining the safe distance. These safe distances can be extremely far, and a long-range infiltration capability is essential.

"...the Special Warfare Center and School will take the lead in the development of Army surface-operations doctrine and the standardization of waterborne equipment for Army special operations forces."

Although the course is new, these skills are not; they have been required by special operations units since their inception. Yet even though surface operations represent the most likely means of executing waterborne missions, seldom has any surface operations doctrine been standardized. The training itself has never been institutionalized; units have had to bear the entire training burden, with different units employing different approaches and different training techniques. As a result of the lack of institutional guidance, the procurement, standardization and fielding of operational equipment has also suffered. With formal entry-level training being done by the Special Warfare Center and School, units will now be able to direct their efforts toward mission-specific collective training. Along with the establishment of a surface-operations training base, the Special Warfare Center and School will take the lead in the development of Army surface-operations doctrine and the standardization of waterborne equipment for Army special operations forces.

Course design

The Waterborne Infiltration Course will be divided into five weeks of training at the Waterborne Division, Key West, Fla., and one week in a realistic "fly-away" field training exercise somewhere off the east coast of the United States.

In designing the course, the SWCS has developed the following

WATERBORNE INFILTRATION COURSE

Phase I Subjects	Phase II Subjects	Phase III Subjects
■ Navigation	■ Rubber Boats	■ Intermediate Delivery Systems Planning/Operations – Debarkation – Rendezvous
■ Weather	■ Kayak – Emergency Procedures – Sailing Techniques – Caching – Portage Operations	■ Surf Operations
■ Intermediate Delivery Systems Introduction – Submarine – Surface Ships – Fixed-Wing Aircraft (Delivery Only) – Helicopters	■ Surface Swimming – Team Formations and Techniques – Swimming W/Equipment – Dry/Wet Suits – Waterproofing and Rigging	■ Mission Specific Tactical Exercises – Direct Action – Special Reconnaissance
■ Marine Hazards		
■ Marine Medical First Aid		

critical tasks for soldiers with waterborne-related missions:

– conduct surface-swimmer transits up to 10,000 meters

– conduct rubber-boat transits of more than 50 nautical miles

– conduct kayak transits up to 30 nautical miles

– conduct surface operations in all environmental and climatic conditions

– integrate terminal delivery methods (surface-swimmer, rubber-boat and kayak) with intermediate delivery systems, including fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, military and commercial surface vessels, and submarines

– conduct operations during daylight and darkness

– accurately navigate over extended distances in all conditions

– conduct at-sea rendezvous with rotary-wing aircraft, surface vessels and submarines during all conditions

– conduct extensive pre-mission operational planning

– infiltrate and exfiltrate detachment operational equipment

– conduct system maintenance as required

– conduct cache activities.

Course structure

The Waterborne Infiltration Course is broken into three phases. In Phase I, students will learn all aspects of surface operations planning. Phase II will be more "hands-on" oriented, as students receive intensive training in the three terminal delivery methods (small boat, kayak and surface swim). In Phase III, students will conduct tactical exercises employing all delivery means, both independently and in combination, in conjunction with a variety of intermediate delivery systems. Phase III will end with a realistic field training exercise.

"The objective of the first phase...is to have the students become proficient in all aspects of operations planning. This is essential, as the open ocean is a unique environment and totally foreign to the majority of special operations soldiers."

Phase I

The objective of the first phase, which consists of six training days and involves approximately 70 hours, is to have the students become proficient in all aspects of operations planning. This is essential, as the open ocean is a unique environment and totally foreign to the majority of special operations soldiers. Because the nautical chart is the waterborne operator's main planning graphic, students will train extensively in charting courses, using geographic coordinates, plotting dead-reckoned courses and applying time-distance-speed calculations.

Training will place special emphasis on computing tide and tidal-current data needed to plot the tidal current offset, which is essential to successful open-ocean navigation. Developing the offset involves computing the direction and velocity of the currents (both the ocean currents and the currents near the shore) and applying their effects on the delivery means. Current effect sometimes requires the course to be considerably offset for a detachment to reach its objective on time. Computing and applying this data will be practiced to proficiency in Phase I.

Students will also receive an overview of intermediate delivery systems used to transport detachments to their debarkation points and the planning considerations associated with each system.

Intermediate delivery systems take many forms; perhaps the best is the submarine. Submarines can move virtually undetected in all environmental conditions and may be relied upon for pinpoint accuracy; they can deliver swimmers and boat teams to their debarkation points with absolute secrecy. Submarines also have superior communications systems which are a tremendous asset to the embarked detachment.

Large surface vessels are also outstanding intermediate delivery systems, and both military and commercial ships are considered in mission planning. As with submarines, many surface vessels are equipped with superb navigation and communications systems. Both delivery systems allow a detachment to continue to refine its mission planning while en route to the debarkation point.

A variety of high-performance fixed-wing aircraft may also be used to deliver waterborne operators. One of the most effective aircraft delivery methods is the "rubber-duck." In this operation, an inflatable boat is connected to a wooden platform with a cargo parachute attached. The boat engine and all the detachment's equipment are packed in the boat. The boat is dropped at the debarkation point and the detachment parachutes behind it, assembling on the boat. The parachutes and platform are jettisoned, the engine is attached and the detachment is rapidly en route to its objective. If the distance from the debarkation point to the landing site is less than 10,000 meters, aircraft may also be used simply to parachute surface swimmers.

Helicopters can also be used as delivery systems. The long-range capability of the UH-60 Blackhawk makes it an excellent option. The CH-46 and CH-47 are capable of performing "soft-duck" operations, in which an inflatable assault boat is simply rolled off the ramp into the ocean with the boat team following behind. For soft-duck operations, the altitude is kept as low as possible, normally around 10 feet.

If a boat is not necessary, the swimmers simply jump off the ramp or out the side door into the water. This technique is called helocasting. All of these intermediate delivery systems, with the exception of fixed-wing aircraft, can also be used to recover exfiltrating detachments. During Phase I, students will become thoroughly familiar with these systems.



U.S. Army photo

Helicopters such as this UH-60 Blackhawk are excellent delivery and recovery methods. Students will practice recovery as well as delivery methods, since exfiltration is equally as critical.

In preparation for open-ocean exercises, the magnetic compass and basic and advanced piloting procedures will be heavily emphasized. Finally, students will receive instruction in marine hazards and medical considerations, as well as planning factors dealing with weather forecasting.

The planning skills practiced and mastered in Phase I will form the foundation from which individual skills may be applied in Phase II.

Phase II

Phase II is clearly the meat of the Waterborne Infiltration Course. In this phase, which consists of approximately 20 training days, students move from the classroom to the open ocean. Students begin with six training days using the Zodiac F-470 Marine Commando, an inflatable rubber boat specifically designed to support special operations. The Zodiac F-470 is standard throughout the special opera-

tions forces of the United States and many allied services as well. It has several inflatable compartments as well as an inflatable hull, and it comes with wooden–plank and aluminum floors. The Zodiac F–470 can be air–dropped and will carry up to six operators with equipment, although the boat will function more efficiently with four personnel and equipment. The F–470 is designed to be powered by the standard MARS 35–horsepower engine, a silent, waterproof system that is excellent for certain special operations missions. For long open–ocean transits with a heavily laden boat, however, students will use a stronger 55–horsepower engine.

As part of their rubber–boat training, students will chart courses of various distances and make extended–distance transits using assorted navigational techniques, including state–of–the–art electronic navigational aids which help the navigator in determining speed, estimating time of arrival and making course corrections en route. Students will conduct transits both day and night and in all types of tidal–current conditions, with distances varying from 10 to 80 nautical miles.

Following the rubber–boat training, students will learn to use the kayak. The kayak, frequently referred to as a canoe, was highly effective in waterborne operations during World War II. Members of Britain's Special Boat Section used canoes with outstanding successes throughout the Mediterranean. Because of the extremely low radar signature of the kayak and its compatibility with nearly all intermediate delivery systems, it remains an excellent option today. Like the Zodiac F–470, the kayak is used by the special operations forces of numerous allied services. Students will plan and complete long–distance kayak movements, called "paddles," up to 30 nautical miles in all conditions. They will also learn emergency procedures, sailing techniques, storage of operational equipment, caching procedures and methods of conducting over–land portage operations with the kayak.

"The significant advantage of surface swimming is that it does not require a tremendous amount of training and is not dependent upon highly technical equipment. It is *dependent upon superior physical conditioning and practiced swimming techniques."*

Following kayak training, students will train in surface–swimmer techniques. Surface swimming, commonly referred to as scout swimming, is an excellent technique to deliver small groups of personnel from a distant launch point to a beach landing site. An intermediate delivery system is used to bring the swimmers as close to the beach landing site as possible; however, a well–trained unit can routinely swim distances in excess of 10 kilometers with equipment. Training will center on team swimming formations and techniques, swimming with assorted types of protective equipment (dry suits and wet suits), and swimming with operational equipment loads.

The significant advantage of surface swimming is that it does not require a tremendous amount of training and is not dependent upon highly technical equipment. It *is* dependent upon superior physical conditioning and practiced swimming techniques. With proper equipment and conditioning, the average special operations soldier can rapidly become a skilled surface swimmer.

Students will learn to construct team swim lines which will enable them to remain together during all types of environmental conditions. Team swim lines are not only safer, they also aid in pace determination and navigation. Either a line or a column formation is used, with each swimmer holding on to a hand loop at his position.

Training will concentrate on waterproofing, rigging individual equipment loads and ensuring individual loads are neutral buoyant for greater ease of movement through the water and maintenance of a low profile. Combat surface infiltration swims will be conducted from distances of 500–10,000 meters.



Photo by Al Petersen

Phase III

Phase III, the final two weeks of the course, will require the students to conduct a variety of tactical exercises. Each exercise will involve intensive planning and long–distance surface movements. A different intermediate delivery system will be used for each problem, and the terminal methods (surface swim, rubber boat and kayak) will be used in combination. These scenarios will all be mission–specific and designed to allow the students to apply all previous instruction. Initial training will be conducted in the Key West area. Students will make day and night open–ocean parachute drops with dry suits and full combat gear, link up in the water and conduct tactical combat surface swims to an objective beach landing site. Other exercises will find the students working with Blackhawk helicopters, performing surface–swimmer casting and small boat and kayak insertions. CH–47s will also be used as students perform soft–duck insertions, surface swimmer casting and at–sea ladder recovery operations. Finally, students will be supported by a variety of large Navy and Coast Guard surface support vessels as they practice at–sea planning and debarkation and conduct at–sea rendezvous. All of this training will be conducted in the Key West area during Week Five.

Following the first week of Phase III, students will pack up equipment and deploy for a comprehensive field training exercise. Before the FTX, students will receive training in surf operations, since that training is not possible at Key West. During the FTX, a three–day operation, students will conduct rubber–duck exercises, execute joint–service planning and coordination, work with helicopters and large support ships, conduct cache activities, and complete field planning and portage movements. The exercise will be challenging, since it will combine rugged climatic and environmental conditions with unfamiliar surroundings to produce a realistic situation. Effective planning will be critical, as the FTX will evaluate all previous instruction.

Who Can Attend?

Prerequisites for the Waterborne Infiltration Course include the following:

- Be a member of an active or reserve Army unit or selected DoD personnel, or assigned or on orders to a SOF unit;
- Pass the Army Physical Fitness Test with a minimum score of 60 points in each event and an overall score of 206 or more (scored on the 17–25 age group in accordance with FM 21–20);
- Pass a 50–meter swim test with boots and fatigues;
- Complete a 300–meter surface swim using any stroke;
- Pass a Type–A medical examination.

The Waterborne Division highly recommends that students be in superior physical condition for the Waterborne Infiltration Course. The requirements of the course are quite demanding, since individual waterborne skills themselves are very strenuous. The physical training program of the course will be educational and objective–oriented in design, with specific regimens directed toward kayaking and surface swimming. Because of the duration of the course and the cumulative effects of continuously strenuous training days, it is critical that students report in excellent condition.

Administrative data

Two pilot courses are scheduled for Jan. 7–Feb. 17 and Feb. 18–March 31. The course is designed for 36 students, and both pilot courses will be attended by a full complement of students from the 1st Special Operations Command. The SWCS anticipates conducting several courses each year, but the number of courses to be conducted in the future will be dependent upon the demand from the SOCOM community.

The standardization of waterborne training is long overdue. From the Mediterranean in World War II to the more recent events in the Falkland Islands and Grenada, small units have been required to conduct long–distance waterborne operations to accomplish their missions. In the future, waterborne operations will continue to play a significant role in all armed conflicts. The Waterborne Infiltration Course will produce special operations soldiers capable of planning and conducting any type of surface–related waterborne mission. Its implementation will increase operational readiness and serve commanders at all levels in the execution of special operations missions. ✂

Capt. Patrick Desmond served at Key West from 1985–1988 as chief of the Waterborne Division of the Special Operations Advanced Skills Department and was one of the primary developers of the Waterborne Infiltration Course. A former Special Forces NCO commissioned in 1978, he has served with the 46th SF Company in Thailand and on scuba teams in the 5th and 10th SF Groups. He is currently pursuing a master's degree in Latin American studies at the University of New Mexico.

The Tri–Zone Concept:

Allocation of SOF assets in a counterinsurgency

by Capt. William M. Susong

Today, special operations forces are key to success in the area of low–intensity conflict. But even though the various SOF elements -- psychological operations, Rangers, Special Forces and civil affairs -- are fully committed to that mission, they are a finite resource which must be used carefully. And while everyone talks "LIC," there are still gaps in doctrine and analysis to support SOF operations and guide us in using them skillfully and efficiently.

Using counterinsurgency operations as a model, for instance, we still do not have standard terms of reference for gauging and discussing the course and progress of an insurgency. The measured commitment of SOF assets cannot occur, however, without a firm grasp of the tactical and strategic state of a particular insurgency, and the ability to examine an insurgency from a perspective of resource allocation is critical.

A method of analysis called the tri–zone concept can help in performing such an examination. The tri–zone concept divides an insurgency according to the three natural divisions which occur during its development. The technique can provide a standard by which to evaluate an insurgency and commit counterinsurgency forces, naturally to include SOF. In addition, having agreed–upon, standard definitions and terms serves the SOF community well in all aspects of operations and planning.

Basically, the concept dissects a country geographically according to the degree of impact the insurgency is having on the population. Based on these three insurgent zones of operation which always develop, the intelligence analyst, the planner, the operator and the commander can all discuss an insurgency in the same terms.

The first step in the tri–zone is analysis, and as an intelligence function, the perspective is the enemy's. While looking through the enemy's eyes may not appeal to us emotionally, it allows the planner and the operator to focus on the insurgent's strong points. Insurgents strive to develop total control over a country through stages or degrees. They begin expansion efforts into a new area, progress to the point of influencing both the political and the military situations, and finally gain control over a specific geographic area.

Three zones

A **zone of expansion** is characterized by little insurgent military capability and an emphasis on establishing a base of insurgent support from the population. In a **zone of influence** the situation is militarily balanced between the insurgent and government forces. Here insurgent combat units are weakening the security forces while simultaneously attempting to proselytize more of the population to their cause. A **zone of control** is an area in which the insurgents have military and political dominance and pursue their objectives in relative safety. Recognition of each of the three zones is critical to application of military and civilian resources to combat the insurgency.

After hostilities begin, the tri–zone concept monitors the course of a war and in a general sense, gauges the success or failure of the insurgency. The tri–zone concept is a tool designed to define and track the insurgent's geopolitical progress. As with any tool, it is only as effective as the one who uses it. Final analytical decisions remain subjective. The actual mechanics of constructing a tri–zone analysis fall to the intelligence analyst. Using an intelligence process called a zone matrix, the analyst combines observable indicators of insurgent progress with geographic areas to delineate these "zones" of operation.

When designating zones of operation in any country at war with insurgents, two principles apply:

- *Any insurgent area of a country begins as a zone of expansion.* Although the insurgency may develop with such speed as to make the transition seem instantaneous, there is nevertheless an evolution.
- *As a corollary, when a counterinsurgency is successful, the insurgent zone of operation dissolves in the reverse direction,* i.e., from control to influence to expansion.

As you examine the tri–zone concept, you will notice the insurgency is rural based, not urban. While not ignoring the latter, the majority of successful insurgencies are and have been rural.

Zone of expansion

A closer examination of the zones will clarify the tri–zone concept and illustrate its usefulness. Beginning with a typical zone of expansion, we find a rural base of subsistence agriculture, possibly some export crops, with most of the manpower tied to these activities. Government representation is minimal and marginally responsive at best. Public utilities are scarce and usually a common–usage type such as a village well or town phone. In effect, the citizen views the government as unresponsive and sees personal goals and aspirations of a better life as unattainable. The insurgent is aware of these shortcomings, frequently having come from the same area himself. He offers to teach a few children to read, shares his meager first–aid supplies, and offers an ideological formula to improve the political system. It may be easy to ignore such humble efforts by the insurgent, but these actions have impact and potential. Teaching four children the alphabet may seem puny in comparison to government promises of five–room schoolhouses, but in the end the peasant father will give his allegiance to whoever brings a better life, however slight, to him and his.

Examining a country in terms of the tri–zone concept can define the geographic boundaries and the physical and socioeconomic circumstances of an expansion zone. This provides a government with a baseline assessment for use in designing a complete counterinsurgency plan. If the insurgents have surveyed an area and found exploitable weaknesses, the government could beat them to the punch by responding to the people's needs with projects which yield long–term results. A focus on education, basic health and agrarian reform could be key. Current SOF initiatives such as Special Operations Forces Humanitarian Assistance Teams, called SOFHAT, are ideally suited to countering the newly–formed insurgent threat in a country.

As can be seen, the majority of a government's counterinsurgency activity in expansion zones is nonmilitary, as well it should be. After the government has proven its responsiveness and commitment to its citizens, the civil–defense program has a chance of taking hold, as the citizen will feel he has something (a well, education for his children, more food) to defend. In theory and in practice, an effective and responsive government will undercut the insurgent's ability to gain supporters.

Zone of influence

In other parts of this hypothetical country, the war has expanded beyond the initial stages. There military force is required to counter the insurgents' ability to conduct both military and political actions. Overall, these zones of influence are the most hotly contested portions of the country. A portion of the populace actively supports the revolution. The insurgents have been able to develop base camps and supply caches. The enemy military infrastructure will be relatively complete with regional command, control, communications and intelligence elements and support facilities such as field clinics, explosive construction shops, or small training camps.



File photo

Zones of influence are usually based on terrain which supports insurgent military operations short of attempts to take and hold terrain against the government's military forces. Depending on the circumstances of a particular engagement, the insurgents have the potential to defeat the government force. A delicate balance exists between the opposing forces: Both sides are capable from moment to moment of seizing the initiative and winning a battle. Sometimes the "battle" is a platoon–sized meeting engagement, other times it is gaining the trust of a village through humanitarian and civic–action projects.

In the zone of influence a nation's overall plan to counter an insurgency is put to the test. It fails or succeeds based on the results of the battles in this zone. The insurgents will employ brutal means to prevent the perception of a benevolent government. A purely military solution is not viable; the population, traumatized by constant combat, sees only more destruction at the hands of the soldier. The most disciplined and highly–trained soldiers are needed, but they must also be capable of achieving the government's nation–building objectives. Behind the shield of military force, the civic–action plan has to rebuild the peasant's community as well as his faith in the government. If the conditions which allowed the insurgents to gain a foothold are not corrected, all the military force in the world will not shake the grip of the insurgent.

An actual example from an on–going insurgency clearly illustrates the dynamics involved: A government patrol enters a small village and passes by a crudely constructed school. Pausing to speak to the children, the patrol leader is alarmed

ASSET ALLOCATION MATRIX

SOF ASSET	ZONE		
	EXPANSION	INFLUENCE	CONTROL
Rangers			
Operational Forces			■
Training – Patrolling		■	
– LRRP			■
PSYOP			
Operational Forces	■	■	■
Training – Tactical Employment		■	■
– National Strategy	■		
Special Forces			
Operational Forces		■	■
Training – Counterterrorism	■		
– Basic Soldier Skills	■	■	■
Civil Affairs			
Operational Forces – MEDRETT	■	■	
– ENGRETT	■	■	
Training	■	■	

to discover their schoolbooks are produced by the insurgents and laced with Marxist–Leninist doctrine. Reflexively, he orders the books to be collected and destroyed. As the patrol departs the area, a small child approaches the officer and sadly states that they (the insurgents) said that the government wanted to keep its people ignorant and suppressed. Horrified at the child's interpretation, the officer quickly returns with new books and pencils. Newly aware of the real battlefield (the child's allegiance) the military patrol acts to reinforce the values of the nation while still pursuing the insurgent combatants.

Zone of control

Meeting engagements, ambushes, attacks and occupation of strategic facilities are common in the final zone to be discussed, that of control. Conventional small–scale military operations are the main activities of the insurgents within these geographic bases which they dominate. The strategic command–and–control nodes, as well as extensive supply and medical facilities, function with only sporadic interruption by government operations. Propaganda is rare, as the population has already been co–opted. Insurgent offensive operations are used primarily to intimidate the local security forces and constrain the government's area of operation.

With their safe havens and concentrations of materials and manpower, control zones contain the most lucrative *military targets* of the three zones. The key to defeating the *military* leadership of the insurgency depends on aggressive, sustained military operations in control zones. Humanitarian and civic–assistance operations will have to follow military success. "Taking the war to the enemy" while respecting the human rights of the innocent is the only way to break the insurgent's stranglehold in these areas.

Using decentralized operations and trained combat units, the military must bear the brunt of the war in the control zones. Over time, as the tide turns in favor of the government, the role of the security forces diminishes, and they are replaced by civil–defense units which have developed under the protective wing of the military. A vigorous civic–action program supported by all components of the government provides tangible proof of the government's legitimacy. In turn, the citizen is motivated to defend his community and is receptive to the idea of civil–defense units.

Without dwelling on the actual analytical process for identifying the individual zones, it is important to recognize that a substantial step has been made by dividing a country into its functional parts (tri–zones) from a counterinsurgency perspective. The tri–zone concept allows operators, planners and decision makers to view the insurgency from a single perspective.

From the commander's point of view, this conceptual process presents clear geopolitical divisions, allowing him to apply SOF assets according to the strengths and weaknesses of each of the zones of operation. This way, the particular skills of the SOF disciplines can be used to the best advantage. Through the use of the tri–zone, both U.S. and host governments can focus extremely finite resources prudently.

In the zones of control the conventional military has the dominant role by attacking the enemy's strategic rear guard by sustained small–unit operations. In zones of influence the situation demands a balanced commitment of both military and civic–action resources, in which neither discipline can compensate for the other. These joint civil–military operations, which include strategic and tactical psychological operations, are the means by which to shift the confidence and support of the people from the insurgent to the government.

And finally, a counterinsurgency lead in the zones of expansion belongs to the civilian organizations within the government. U.S. Army civic–action units are tailor–made to help the organizations develop their nation–building skills. Civic action can address legitimate grievances from the citizenry and develop alliances between the people and politicians which in turn will insulate the population from the effects of insurgent propaganda. Again, psychological operations overlay all actions to maximize their impact.

The zone–matrix illustration gives visual examples of how SOF resources might be apportioned under the tri–zone concept.

Moving down the matrix, and with apologies to the various SOF components for any simplification made for the sake of illustration, Rangers could be employed as mobile training teams for advanced combat skills for a country's experienced ground forces. Subjects such as long–range reconnaissance, fixed–site security and advanced patrolling would be appropriate. Rangers could also be employed as a last resort (at the discretion of the national command authority) if the country has developed a sizable insurgent zone or zones and is threatened with a military defeat. Operationally, Rangers would be used in the zone of control to shore up the host nation's tactical military capability. As stated earlier, an aggressive, sustained ground battle must be waged in the zone of control.

Psychological operations are the vehicle for re–establishing the bond between the government and the people. At the tactical level, PSYOP mobile training teams could teach patrolling soldiers how to reinforce on–going humanitarian and civic actions in the zones of expansion and influence. Consistent, credible information is needed to overcome a strong negative image of the host–nation's military. Analysis of insurgent propaganda provides the government an insight into the thinking processes of the enemy and his evaluation of exploitable government weaknesses. In the capital, training of general–staff personnel in PSYOP principles would help in the creation of an all–encompassing campaign plan. Such a plan coordinates PSYOP at all levels and is flexible enough to capitalize on short–notice PSYOP opportunities.

"Vital manpower and equipment must be husbanded due to scarcity and global missions. Certainly once SOF are deployed, results are expected; the tri–zone can aid in making the most effective use of their deployments."

As with the Rangers, PSYOP forces are used to augment host–nation capabilities only as a last resort.

By design, Special Forces are well–suited to LIC. Yet they cannot be all things to all situations. As trainers of basic soldier skills within the zones of influence and in supporting civil–defense plans throughout the country, Special Forces are the right tool for the job. Even within the zones of control, the SF teams can offer host–nation forces training in specialized skills.

Unfortunately, while it has a great deal to offer LIC, Civil Affairs routinely gets little emphasis. Medical readiness and training teams, called MEDRETTs, and engineer readiness and training teams, called ENGRETTs, are worth their weight in gold when deployed. As might be expected, zones of expansion and zones of influence belong to CA teams. Actually, within expansion zones, the CA elements are best suited to orchestrate all SOF actions. Due to the nature of CA, there is little distinction between its training and operational roles.

The development of LIC decision–making tools such as the tri–zone concept aids in the commitment of SOF resources. Vital manpower and equipment must be husbanded due to scarcity and global missions. Certainly once SOF are deployed, results are expected; the tri–zone can aid in making the most effective use of their deployments. Also the delicacy of introduction of SOF assets into a foreign country dictates sound planning and resource allocation.

Standardized concepts and agreed–upon terms of reference will go a long way toward demystifying low–intensity conflict. LIC is no harder to analyze than conventional forms of conflict. The problem is that as professionals, we are not adequately prepared to conduct it, nor as an institution have we been effectively committed to winning it. The tri–zone concept is one step in the critical process of filling the gaps in LIC doctrine and analysis. Into the 21st century the pre–eminent challenge to SOF operators and analysts alike is not the Third World War, but the Third World's wars. ✂

Capt. William M. Susong is a graduate of the Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses. His civilian education includes a BA in psychology and a master's degree in strategic intelligence. Captain Susong has served as a battalion intelligence officer, battalion reconnaissance platoon leader and commander of a mechanized ground surveillance radar company. His last assignment was that of chief of the El Salvador analysis cell of the J2 directorate of USSOUTHCOM. Captain Susong currently serves at Fort Bragg as the chief of the Strategic Studies Detachment, 1st PSYOP Battalion, 1st Special Operations Command.

Special Operations in the Iran-Iraq War

by Capt. William H. Burgess III



Contrary to popular belief, the Iran–Iraq war did not begin in 1980; modern Iran and Iraq have fought in the shadows 30 years for political and economic hegemony in the Persian Gulf.

Phase I (1959–1975)

From 1959, the Iranian Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi supported the *pesh merga* Iraqi Kurdish separatists, led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, with money, weapons, supplies, training intelligence and, possibly, occasional battlefield advisors. Allegedly, Israeli soldiers of Iraqi Jewish extraction also trained and advised Kurdish guerrillas in Iranian training bases and on the battlefield in Iraq. The Iraqis suffered an estimated 60,000 casualties at the hands of the Kurds from the early 1960s to 1975.[1]

At the same time, the Iraqis supported ethnic Arab separatists in Iran's oil–rich and ethnically Arab Khuzistan Province. Khuzistan, called "Arabistan" by the Iraqis, was annexed by Iran in 1936, an action that has irritated Arab nationalists in the Gulf ever since. The Iraqis also aided anti–monarchist "progressive" forces within and without Iran, including some among Iran's own Kurdish population. Iranian socialists, ethnic nationalists, and religious fundamentalists (including the current Iranian ruler, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini) found succor in Iraq.

Phase I ended with the signing of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, when Iran was politically and militarily much stronger than Iraq. This accord defined the Iran–Iraq land border, divided the strategic Shatt al–Arab, and ended the meddling of each in the affairs of the other. The Kurdish resistance in Iraq quickly collapsed, and Barzani ultimately died in exile in Washington, D.C. The war then entered a five–year dormant phase.

"The two nations netted significantly different results from their counterinsurgency efforts, however; Iraq was largely successful, but the Iranians faltered."

Phase II (1975–1980)

Despite the signing of the accords, each nation retained the potential for unconventional warfare in the other's territory.[2] Meanwhile, the internal opposition in each country consolidated its relative positions: The Iranians polarized into pro–regime monarchists, opposition social–democrats, leftists (the Tudeh Party communists and the socialist Peoples Mujahedeen), and religious fundamentalists -- *Al Dawa al Islamiya* (The Call of Islam) and followers of Khomeini -- while the Iraqis polarized into pro–regime socialists (Baathists, who came to power in 1968), anti–regime communists, ethnic nationalists, and religious fundamentalists. In 1978, the Shah invoked the Algiers Agreement and called upon Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to expel Khomeini after 15 years' residence there, on the ground that Khomeini was destabilizing the Iranian government. Khomeini subsequently moved to France and denounced the agreement as an unholy conspiracy between the U.S., the Iraqi Baathists and the Shah.

During this dormant phase, the Iraqis and Iranians co–opted their legitimate oppositions and drove their illegal oppositions underground. The Iranian secret police, SAVAK, rooted out and killed hundreds of communists, separatists and religious fundamentalists (allegedly including Khomeini's son, in 1977). It drove hundreds more into internal exile. The Iraqi Mukhabarat secret police first turned on the communists. By 1979, the Iraqi communists were either dead, in prison or in political exile.[3] Next, the Mukhabarat crushed the Shiite dissident *Al Dawa* and continued the arrests, executions and large–scale population relocations of the Kurds, begun several years earlier at the height of the insurgency, until the resistance was annihilated.

The two nations netted significantly different results from their counterinsurgency efforts, however; Iraq was largely successful, but the Iranians faltered. In Iraq, the monolithic Baath Socialist Party eventually emerged as all–pervasive and omnipotent, while the Shah gradually lost his grip on Iran. Where Iran ultimately became politically fragmented and succumbed to revolution and the rise of a fundamentalist Islamic theocracy, Iraq stabilized under an authoritarian, one–party secular oligarchy.

After the 1979 Iranian revolution, Khomeini incited and aided fundamentalist revolutionaries and Kurdish separatists in Iraq. In summer 1980, Iran also began massing troops along its common border with Iraq. Iraq responded with its own military buildup and deployed naval infantry commandos and other forces into Iran on reconnaissance and other missions. The Iranians captured and executed one Iraqi commando "spy" several weeks prior to the outbreak of fighting between the conventional forces.

Phase III (1980–1988)

The Iraqis spearheaded their initial invasion of Iran with special operations forces from their two ground–force and one naval special operations brigades then extant. A few disaffected former members of the old Imperial Iranian Special Forces Brigade were also integrated with these forces. The overall effect of these SO brigades appears to have been negligible, due largely to the speed of the Iraqi armored advance.

The use of unconventional warfare was revitalized as conventional fighting broke out in 1980. The Iranians resumed covertly supplying the Iraqi Kurds led by Masoud Barzani (son of Mustafa Barzani) of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.[4] Shiite fundamentalist Islamic revolutionary cells

were energized in Iraq and throughout the Middle East. They recruited Iraqi Army deserters, disaffected prisoners of war, Iraqi military personnel sympathetic to Iran and thousands of Iraqis of Iranian descent who had been summarily expelled from Iraq in the wake of the Iranian revolution. As the Kurds received more arms, the Peoples Mujahedeen[5] began terror bombings and assassinations in Baghdad. Disaffected Iraqis slipped into the country to commit sabotage and engage in political action, and Islamic revolutionary fronts also began political and military action throughout the Middle East, Europe, Asia and North America.

Within the Iraqi Army, the number of ground–force SO brigades increased to seven or eight by late 1987. Each division was given a complement of one or two "commando" or "special forces" battalions. Special–forces battalions had also allegedly been added to the 16 brigades of the Republican Guards and to the more elite Presidential Guard Armored Brigade by the time Iraq went on the offensive in early 1988. The separate SO brigades were used effectively during Phase III for tactical–operational reconnaissance, deep raiding and prisoner snatching. The divisional commando battalions were seemingly used as mobile "fire brigades" for rear–area combat operations. During the 1988 Iraqi counteroffensives, the Republican Guards used assigned special–forces battalions for nighttime dismounted reconnaissance and raiding in front of and on the flanks of the main attacks.

Iraqi UW

At the outset of Phase III, the Iraqis also reasserted contacts with "progressive" resistance and Arab separatist forces inside Iran and activated sabotage and terrorist organizations against the mullahs. Iraqi use of the Peoples Mujahedeen,[6] which had conducted UW for the Iranians until 1982, is instructive.

With the ascendancy of more radical fundamentalist elements in the Iranian government, the Iranians turned on the Mujahedeen in 1982 and on the Tudeh Party in 1983, driving those organizations deep underground and into foreign exile. The Tudeh Party activists who fled Iran relocated in the Soviet Union and other communist countries (fostering rumors that some of these expatriates have worked with Soviet special–purpose forces in pseudo–operations against the Afghan resistance along the Iran–Afghanistan border). They have since conducted several terrorist operations against the Iranians, but as of mid–1988 do not appear to have coordinated any of their actions with the Iraqis.

Mujahedeen activists led by Massoud Rajavi fled mostly to France, Iraq and other socialist or democratic nations in Western Europe

and the Middle East. In June 1986, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac closed the Mujahedeen headquarters in France and expelled the Mujahedeen leadership in a secret deal involving resumed arms sales to Iran in exchange for the release of Frenchmen held hostage by Hizbullah terrorists in Lebanon. By the time of its expulsion from France and relocation to Iraq, the Mujahedeen had evolved into an essentially anti–Western, socialist, "Islamic–reformist" Iranian insurgent group dominated by Western–educated and Western–trained leaders and beholden to Iraq for sponsorship in its attacks on the Khomeini government.

Initially, the Iraqi–supported Mujahedeen conducted terrorist bombings and assassinations of "unpopular" Iranian officials. Many operations attributed by the Iranian government to the Mujahedeen in this period, however, were actually instances of violence among various factions of the mullahs. Soon after setting up operations in Iraq, the Mujahedeen began psychological operations and guerrilla–style cross–border sabotage, ambush and prisoner–snatch raids into Iranian rear areas from five Iraqi bases along the north–central war front. Under Iraqi tutelage, the Mujahedeen expanded its manpower with Iranian refugees, deserters and POWs, and in 1987 it developed a 5,000– 10,000–member conventional fighting wing called the National Liberation Army. By late 1987, the Mujahedeen was conducting a variety of rear–area special operations and conventional motorized rifle–brigade–sized raids alongside the regular Iraqi Army. It was claiming substantial victories over Iranian regular and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasadaran) forces as far as 100 miles into Iranian territory.[7]

Iranian UW

The secretive 11–member Supreme Defense Council in Tehran has used three different means to conduct UW against Iraq and its other enemies. First, it has relied on regular Army SOF, believed to consist mainly of reconnaissance/assault forces similar to Western long–range reconnaissance patrol units and which include the 55th Airborne Brigade, possibly remnants of the older Imperial Special Forces Brigade (who were mostly street thugs used to trash anti–regime demonstrators in the heyday of the Shah[8]), and separate SO brigades. The Iranians may have a total dedicated SOF structure of one separate airborne infantry brigade and as many as four SO brigades organized within the 23rd Special Forces Division. One Western source[9] states that three brigades of Iranian "airborne commandos" became operational in 1986 and describes these brigades as Syrian–trained, supported by one squadron of helicopters each, and used for reconnaissance and quick raids against communications lines, tank concentrations, artillery bases and command posts. Army SOF are believed to be employed strictly for tactical raiding, divisional ground reconnaissance and the seizure of key terrain in support of larger conventional formations.

The second, larger and more specialized means comprises Pasadaran[10] elements within a possible brigade structure. These forces are mainly dedicated to operational–strategic UW. In late 1984 or early 1985,[11] the Iranians set about organizing a joint brigade for the prosecution of strategic land, sea and air UW in enemy rear areas. The effort was allegedly conducted under the auspices of Ayatollah Seyed Mohammed Khatami and his Ministry of National Guidance, which is responsible for the export of the Iranian revolution.

The brigade was to be built around Iranian units then operating in Lebanon and was to be composed of approximately 1,500 to 2,000 operational personnel, not including commanders and staff, drawn from all branches of the Iranian armed forces. Command and control was likely to be exercised through the Pasadaran. Among the primary requirements, each operator had to be not more than 30 years old, a combat veteran of the war with Iraq, a high–school graduate, politically reliable, and "totally committed to martyrdom." This force was to be trained by "ground–force experts in partisan warfare," drawn from the various services. Intelligence support to this force was to be provided by intelligence officers detached from the various services, with likely field–agent support provided by the Foreign Ministry. At formation, the brigade's target priorities were to be: first, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain; second, Jordan; and third, France and other countries "opposed to the Islamic Republic." Although there is no direct, open–source evidence that this brigade was formed as planned, circumstances suggest that the intended capability was attained.

The third, and most insidious means the Iranians have employed is sponsorship of indigenous fundamentalist Islamic revolutionaries in every country having a significant Muslim population. The effort is overseen by an umbrella organization, the "Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution," headed by Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri. Various Islamic fronts and councils for the liberation of Muslims as far away as The Philippines have set up their headquarters under the aegis of Montazeri in a Tehran building known as "Taleghani Center."[12]

The Supreme Council, with an annual budget estimated to be as high as $1 billion,[13] gives ideological support, assists with planning, funding, logistics and training, and effectively institutionalizes and internationalizes Iranian subversion. Significantly, Iran seldom directly involves its own nationals in foreign operations, and instead uses legions of followers of its revolutionary



creed drawn from the countries Iran is attacking. By the end of Phase III, the Iranians may have "turned over" to the fundamentalist side as many as 26,000 of their approximately 50,000 Iraqi POWs, some of whom have already been dispatched with Pasadaran forces to Lebanon. A number of these disaffected POWs may ultimately form the nucleus of a new, clandestine "fifth column" in Iraq and the Gulf states or the basis for an overt "Arab Islamic Legion" in the service of Iran.

Tactical operations

At the tactical level of war, the Iranians have used their SO–capable forces for long–range rear–area reconnaissance and the seizure of key terrain, particularly on the 250–mile flat, dry Central Front from Mandali, Iraq to Bostan, Iran. Their clearly defined operational goals were to seize and hold the Baghdad–Basra road, then occupy and hold the Az Zubayr oil–gathering center to cut Iraq in two. During the 1983–86 fight across the marshlands east of Basra, the regular forces and conventionally–organized formations of Pasadaran built causeways across the marshlands to ease the large–scale movement of troops, equipment and supplies as the front moved west. Ahead and on the flanks of these efforts were smaller, waterborne raider units used to scout, and even seize, small islands and oil rigs that the causeways needed either to connect to or bypass. These raiders, mostly Pasadaran, employed small outboard motorboats (powered in many cases by Japanese motors) carrying about a half–dozen lightly armed infantrymen on nighttime (and sometimes daylight) forays through the reeds and floating minefields to scout the enemy rear, launch hit–and–run raids and waterborne ambushes, and assault lightly–held positions. Thus the SO–oriented Pasadaran navy was born.

On the 320–mile, mountainous Northern Front from Oshnoviyeh, Iran to Khanaqin, Iraq,[14] the Iranians conducted force–multiplier operations among the Kurdish resistance in support of the operational goals of seizing and holding the main oil–gathering center at Kirkuk, neutralizing the Iraqi military bases in Rowanduz Gorge, and turning the Iraqi flank on the north. The Iranians also conducted aggressive rear–area reconnaissance and, starting in December 1986, the Pasadaran mounted several rear–area hit–and–run raids on Iraqi positions all along this front. The Iranians also attempted unilateral direct–action missions against principal Iraqi oil–export pipelines in the north (Iraq could not export oil through the Gulf, though it did transship oil via Kuwait). The approximately 100 Pasadaran arrested in August 1987 in Turkey were on such a mission. On Feb. 25, 1988, the Iranian media reported that its irregular "Imam Khomeini forces of the Ninth Badr Brigade" had

launched a three-pronged attack near the Kirkuk oil-gathering center, killing or wounding at least 500 Iraqi troops and capturing many more, though the Iraqis denied the attack took place.[15] By early 1988, Kurdish separatists controlled more than 4,000 square miles of Iraqi territory, while main-force Iranian units had advanced 20 miles down the old military highway leading from the frontier toward Rowanduz Gorge, were menacing Sulaimaniya, and were about 60 miles from Kirkuk and about 15 miles from the Darbandikhan Dam.[16] The reach of Iranian UW, however, extended to these cities and beyond.

On the Central Front[17] the Iranians employed several units of Iraqi expatriates on rear-area unilateral direct-action missions for intelligence collection, sabotage, PSYOP (terrorism) and target destruction. These were conducted under the mantle of the Superior Council of the Iraqi Islamic Revolution, led by the Hodjatoleslam Mohamed Bakr al-Hakim[18] and headquartered at Taleghani Center. The Iranians often trained Iraqis in Iran, moved them to Syria for further training, issued them false Saudi or Kuwaiti passports and then infiltrated them into Iraq through still another country as third-country nationals. Pasadaran are also believed to have been employed on parallel missions, though Iranian practice is not to directly involve any of their own nationals in UW unless absolutely necessary. A resurgent *Al Dawa*, organized, financed, equipped and trained by the Iranians, was also allegedly active in the area, particularly around Baghdad. These UW operations helped to throw the Iraqis defending the Baghdad-Basra line off-guard and caused them to pull troops off the line for rear-area defense. In 1986, main-force Iranian units advanced to within 90 miles of Baghdad.

On the 160-mile, marshy Southern Front from Bostan, Iran to the Persian Gulf,[19] the Iranians conducted unilateral direct-action sabotage, political action and intelligence operations using Revolutionary Guards and Iraqi expatriates in support of the main Iranian effort to turn the Iraqi line of defense and secure the southern approaches to Basra and Baghdad. Fighting on this front was also used to "blood" Islamic commando volunteers from Lebanon and other countries. The Iranians were also indirectly aided in 1987 by an underground of several hundred anti-Hussein Iraqi Army deserters living in area marshlands.

On the Persian Gulf Front from the Faw Peninsula to the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranians conducted maritime reconnaissance, sabotage, seizure and demolition missions using special units of the Pasadaran navy. Occasionally, the regular navy supported them. Early in the war, small commando-type forces seized contested islands and offshore oil rigs where the enemy had mounted sensors or communications gear. On this front, the Iranians hoped to keep their sea line of communication open and to deny (or at least contest) use of the SLOC by the Iraqis and their Kuwaiti allies. To accomplish this, several detachments of Pasadaran naval commandos were deployed to Farsi, Halul, Lavan, Sirri, and Abu Musa islands in the Gulf.[20] In 1985 they began harassing both hostile and neutral shipping in the Gulf.

"On the Persian Gulf Front...the Iranians conducted maritime reconnaissance, sabotage, seizure and demolition missions using special units of the Pasadaran navy."

A typical Iranian naval commando attack on shipping was a limited visibility (usually night) maritime ambush or meeting engagement by two or three small motorboats.[21] Limited visibility or areas of narrow or channeled passage increased the target's vulnerability by causing it to reduce speed. Attack vessels often used included: 43-foot Boghammar[22] launches fitted with 107mm or 140mm RPU-14 type multiple rocket launchers, single or twin DShK 12.7mm medium machine guns and/or possibly 23mm ZU-23 antiaircraft cannon; 30-foot "Boston whaler" craft[23] equipped with a single 12.7mm machine gun or multiple rocket launcher, powered by one or two 200-300 horsepower American-made Johnson or Evinrude outboard motors[24] and holding four to 12 or more Pasadaran each;[25] and, on occasion, 18-foot Zodiac-type inflatable speedboats.[26]

Photographs show these Pasadaran in sand-colored or camouflage-pattern fatigues, normally without headgear and occasionally wearing flotation vests or body armor.[27] When these Pasadaran wore headgear, they normally wore turbans, motorcyclist crash helmets, red bandannas inscribed with Koranic phrases, or, rarely, Iranian Army helmets. Photographs in the Western press have also shown Pasadaran on parade in Tehran wearing combat-swimmer attire.

The naval commandos often raked their target for up to one-half hour with 7.62mm Kalashnikov assault-rifle and DShK 12.7mm armor-piercing, ball, and tracer medium machine-gun fire, RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenades, and sometimes, high explosive and phosphorous rockets fired from "mini-Katyusha" multiple rocket launchers. Some of these small vessels carried man-portable antiaircraft missiles, including American-made Stinger[28] and possibly Soviet-design SA-7 surface-to-air missiles for self-defense. Typically, the Iranians fired directly at the crew cabins, rather than at the hulls of the vessels, in an effort to terrorize the crews and discourage other crews from entering the Gulf. Occasionally, the attackers struck a tanker in two phases: In the first phase, an attempt was made to punch holes in the cisterns containing volatile cargo. In a follow-up attack taking place up to several hours later, an attempt was made to ignite the cargo.[28] Perhaps because of the speed of their quarry, no known accompanying boardings have occurred unless the attack was supported by a regular navy frigate or other such vessel. Occasionally, the commandos struck the wrong vessel, as when they damaged a Japanese tanker carrying a load of Iranian crude oil from Kharg Island in September 1987.[30]

Iranian naval commandos in small craft, and other forces operating out of larger regular navy vessels, mined the Kuwaiti port of Al-Ahmadi under cover of darkness in June 1987.[31] During July to September 1987 they also mined the shipping lanes along the Arab side of the Gulf and outside the Strait of Hormuz as far south as the Saudi port of Fujairah.[32] On the night of Sept. 8, 1987, the U.S. intercepted one such operation when U.S. Army AH-6 helicopters attacked the *Iran Ajr*[33] as it attempted to mine a shipping channel 50 miles northeast of Bahrain.[34] Several vessels struck these mines, including the U.S.-flag tanker *Bridgeton* on June 24, 1987.[35] Ironically, many of the mines placed by the Iranians were swept away by the regular Iranian navy in September 1987 to add credence to Iranian claims that the U.S. had sown the mines.[36] Another possible technique of the Pasadaran naval commandos that was demonstrated on Iranian television in the fall of 1987 was the use of explosives-laden speedboats under remote control (or possibly controlled by a suicide driver) to ram larger vessels,[37] though the technical limitations of this technique preclude any real probability of causing more than slight damage to a large vessel.

The Iranians have also used their Pasadaran navy in massed attacks, or feints, against targets on the Arab side of the Gulf. On the night of Oct. 3, 1987, for example, at least 35[38] and possibly as many as 60[39] Iranian speedboats headed toward Ras al Khafji, a joint Saudi-Kuwaiti oil port near an offshore barge used to support the U.S. naval presence in the Gulf.[40] They were within 20 miles of the Saudi coast when they were reportedly driven off by mock bombing runs from Saudi jets.

There are indications that the Pasadaran navy may also have considered, or is considering, the use of 18-foot fiberglass-hulled remote-control submarines laden with explosives for future anti-ship operations.[41] The Iranians may in fact attempt to build a fleet of miniature submarines for the transport of commandos on round-trip and suicide attacks. Other operations possibly being considered are the use of short-range antiship missiles capable of being launched from small boats, long-range land-based torpedoes, suicide surface-boat attacks, port sabotage, tampering with provisions, and kidnapping of crewmen in tar-

Vital Statistics



Iran

Population: 45.2 million; 6.2 million men fit for military service
Religious Orientation: 93 percent Shiite, 5 percent Sunni
Coastline: 1,976 miles

Combat Forces: 705,000 troops, including 350,000 Revolutionary Guards (Pasadaran) in nine or 10 infantry divisions and separate armor, artillery, air, naval and security units; 500,000 Bassij militiamen under Pasadaran control; 70 operational aircraft; 1,050 armored vehicles; 40 ships
Government: Theocracy under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini since 1979.

Iraq

Population: 15.5 million; 2.03 million fit for military service
Religious Orientation: 55 percent Shiite, 40 percent Sunni (70 percent of the Army is Shiite)
Coastline: 36 miles

Combat Forces: 845,000 troops, including 90,000 elite Republican Guards and 400,000 Popular Army second-line troops; 522 aircraft; 7,600 armored vehicles; 44 ships
Government: Oligarchy under the Baath Socialist Party since 1968.



get nations.[42]

Strategic Iranian UW

The Iranian leadership views the war with Iraq as part of a much wider conflict: Iran's strategic goals are to eradicate Western (non-Islamic) influence in the region and to supplant the governments of the area with pro-Iranian fundamentalist Islamic regimes. Toward these goals, they have organized, financed, trained, equipped and directed a vast underground among area Shiites and other clientele, including "students" throughout the Middle East[43] and beyond. This program of subversion was reorganized and given new impetus as a great *jihad* (struggle) against "anti-Islamic" forces in the region in the wake of a 1982 watershed seminar in Tehran attended by the leading Islamic revolutionaries from throughout the Middle East.[44] Forward operational bases for indoctrination, financing, supply, communications and training are provided by a series of Iranian embassies, consulates, mosques, and other front organizations scattered throughout the Middle East, Europe and North America. The underground is well-financed and closely managed by the Iranians at Taleghani Center.

Hizbullah,[45] which often used the nom de guerre "Islamic Jihad," is a loose coalition of radical Shiites which the Iranians created in Lebanon in 1982 after the Israeli invasion. It represents the Iranians' most prominent success and receives an estimated $6.5 million per month in direct aid from the Iranians,[46] out of an amount estimated as high as $30 million per month spent by the Iranians to promote their influence in Lebanon.[47] Hizbullah, an Iranian proxy but not completely controlled by Iran,[48] is most notorious for its destruction, from 1983 to 1984, of two U.S. Embassy buildings, the U.S. Marine Corps compound (with a loss of 241 U.S. servicemen) and the French military headquarters in Beirut. Hizbullah also masterminded the 1985 hijacking of Trans World Airways flight 847 and now holds approximately one dozen Western hostages in Beirut[49] and in the vicinity of the several-hundred-strong Pasadaran garrison at Baalbek in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.[50] In March 1988, after the Saudis broke diplomatic relations with Iran over Iranian attempts to intimidate Gulf Arab states, Hizbullah undertook a series of sabotage and terrorist attacks against Saudi petrochemical facilities and other targets.[51] Hizbullah is also believed deeply involved in the lucrative production and transportation of heroin to Europe, "legitimized" by a Shiite *fatwa* (religious decree) that permits opium and heroin production as long as the product is sold to "infidels."[52]

Cells organized on the Arabian Peninsula ("Hizbullah of the Arabian Peninsula," as some of its factions sometimes call themselves) commit sabotage, engage in psychological (terror) operations including assassinations and bombings, and collect intelligence. Work slowdowns and vandalism at oil ports, committed to discourage visits from Western ships, have often been traced to the Shiite underground.

In 1981, an Iranian-inspired coup attempt was uncovered in Bahrain.[53] In November 1986, Bahraini authorities uncovered a plot to sabotage critical facilities related to that island's 250,000 barrels-per-day-capacity oil refinery by a three-man underground cell directly linked to Iran.[54] In 1985, an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Kuwaiti ruler was also linked to the Iranians.[55] A rash of Iranian-inspired sabotage of Kuwaiti[56] oil facilities has occurred since 1983,[57] the latest involving a propane storage tank in May 1987.[58] The June mining of the Kuwaiti port of Al-Ahmadi by Pasadaran naval commandos may have received some support from the Shiite underground. In August 1987, the waters off the United Arab Emirates were also mined by Pasadaran, possibly supported by the Shiite underground.

In 1979, Shiites in Saudi Arabia took part in a violent uprising that was quelled only after the introduction of French military advisors.[59] During the 1982 *hajj* (pilgrimage), Saudi officials arrested several Iranians caught trying to smuggle weapons and explosives into the kingdom.[60] In 1986, Saudi security forces discovered explosives in the suitcases of 95 Iranian pilgrims.[61] An Aug. 15, 1987 explosion and fire at the ARAMCO Ras al-Juaima gas liquefaction plant is suspected by some to have been the result of Iranian-directed sabotage, although the official Saudi version is that it was an accident.[62]

The most elaborate Iranian SO in Saudi Arabia was the attempted seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca during the 1987 *Hajj*: Iran sent more than 155,000 pilgrims to Mecca in August 1987, led by Mahdi Karoubi, who is described as a close friend of Ayatollah Khomeini. A special unit of the Pasadaran, possibly organized by the suspected joint UW brigade and including several wounded veterans of the Iran-Iraq War, were trained beforehand to "peacefully" seize the Grand Mosque in the name of the Shiite faith and to declare Khomeini the spiritual leader of all Islam. Because of faulty coordination, the attempt was launched about 48 hours ahead of schedule, went out of control and became violent. The Iranians attacked security personnel and passersby with knives, triggering the tragic killing of at least 402 persons and injuring 649 others in a 90-minute period. Although they did not capture the Grand Mosque, the Iranians reaped a short-term psychological coup among their followers by the "martyrdom" of 275 Iranian pilgrims,[63] though the long-term effects of this operation may have included a diminution of support for the regime within Iran.

Rear battle

As a result of relatively unsecurable borders, a lack of operational depth, and Iranian endeavors, the Iraqis faced a formidable rear-battle task. By 1986, the Kurds in the north were revolting,[64] *Al Dawa* had cells in major Iraqi cities, the Pasadaran were conducting hit-and-run raids up and down the 730-mile front line with Iran, and there was a budding guerrilla movement in the marshes south of Basra. A measure of success also attributable to Iranian UW operations in 1986-88 was that Iraqi President Hussein was seldom seen in public and was very rarely known to associate with persons outside a coterie of close friends.

In October 1987, Western press reports told of shoot-outs at political gatherings in provincial towns as near as 40 miles from Baghdad. Bomb blasts in the center of Baghdad were reported with some regularity. Iraqi pilots were restricted to base at night after several were killed by Iranian agents.[65] As part of its response to the rear-area threat, Iraq executed an estimated 178 Iraqi Shiite clerics, scholars and other religious leaders for their support of Iranian subversion in Iraq.[66] Harsh as this may seem, however, this effort is remarkably restrained in comparison to the Iranian execution of 30,000 regime opponents in the same period, including about 5,000 professional officers in the regular Iranian Army[67] and assassinations committed in neutral countries as far away as London and the suburbs of Washington, D.C.

The overall Iraqi response to the rear-area threat was a combination of the carrot and the stick, although the latter was used far more than the former. The five branches of the Iraqi secret police and their network of informers left little in the country unseen or unheard. A political commissar system checked the loyalties of major Iraqi military formations. "Special forces" battalions and Popular Army units conducted counterreconnaissance and security operations in the Iraqi tactical-operational rear. Traitors, spies and revolutionaries were quickly tried and either executed, jailed or exiled. Forced relocations of the Kurdish population diluted the effectiveness of the Kurdish resistance. Senior government officials limited their public appearances and accessibility.



The internal PSYOP campaign[68] waged by the Iraqis glorified the current regime, magnified the political, cultural and ethnic differences between Iran and Iraq, and minimized the religious element of the struggle. Khomeini and his followers, in contrast, were portrayed as madmen, Persian tyrants bent on enslaving the Arab world,[69] and throwbacks to a darker political and cultural age. The Iranians were further characterized as warmongers who would have invaded Iraq in 1980 had not the Iraqi Army preemptively invaded Iran.

Iranian rear battle during Phase III was markedly less difficult than that experienced by the Iraqis. The murderous course of the Iranian revolution had resulted in the death, imprisonment or exile of virtually anyone or any organization capable of actively opposing the mullahs. The current, worldwide Iranian exile community is estimated at more than 1 million persons. For short-sighted political reasons, the Iraqis never attempted to unify and exploit the strategic resistance potential of these Iranian refugees. Instead, the Iraqis struck up with the relatively unpopular Mujahedeen. The Iranians were also protected by their operational-strategic depth and the relative inaccessibility of their major political centers.

The greatest actual threat to the current Iranian regime never was the Iraqi Army, but the in-fighting among the mullahs. The greatest *perceived* threat within Iranian ruling circles, however, is the regular Iranian Army. Despite being ravaged by purges and thousands of resultant executions, the Army is still viewed by the mullahs as a reservoir of pro-monarchist, anti-fundamentalist sentiment. Soon after the consolidation of the revolution, the Pasadaran was raised from a disorganized irregular militia into a massive, full-blown professional military

and state–security organization to counterbalance the potential threat of the Army. But for the outbreak of conventional fighting with Iraq in 1980, the Army would likely have been completely replaced by the Pasadaran. In the wake of the 1988 Iraqi counteroffensive, the Army may yet be subordinated to the Pasadaran under pending reorganizations. In the meantime, Pasadaran are allowed to bring their individual weapons home from the front when on leave, while regular Army troops are disarmed before they leave the rear.

While Iraqi SO forces have performed credibly in reconnaissance and tactical raiding in support of combined arms counteroffensives, their overall contribution has not been pronounced. This may be due to the relatively conservative approach Iraqi commanders take to operations in the enemy rear, and to their preference in using their overwhelming air superiority to strike targets that might otherwise have to be attacked by UW forces.

At the operational–strategic level, the terrorist–insurgent threat of the Mujahedeen to the Iranians is on the order of a minor, organized urban criminal threat. The lack of a cohesive and extensive base of popular support (many Iranians view the Iraqi–supported Mujahedeen as traitors), Iranian internal security measures, and total government control of the Iranian media have hobbled the potential of the Mujahedeen to spark a popular uprising. Iranian Kurdish resistance potential is also limited, though the proximity of their area of operations to the Iraqi border has made their resupply relatively easy and afforded a potential for linkup with the Mujahedeen's National Liberation Army and formation of a breakaway client state of the Iraqis. If, however, the Iraqis could ever exploit rising popular dissatisfaction with Iranian government economic and military policies and transform it into a popular counterrevolution, the strategic–operational Iraqi UW threat to the Iranian government

could increase markedly.

Phase IV (1988 to present)

The nature and duration of Phase IV of the war, which began with the Aug. 20, 1988 UN–sponsored cease–fire, is difficult to predict while negotiations between Iran and Iraq continue and troop movements are minimal. The negotiations will focus on legal rights, strategic vulnerabilities, and national honor. The specific issues addressed in negotiations will be (1) withdrawal of troops to their respective sides of an internationally–recognized border, (2) control of the Shatt al–Arab waterway, (3) control of 77 square miles on the central Iran–Iraq border in the vicinity of Naft–e–Shah and Qsar–e–Shirin, (4) repatriation of POWs, (5) noninterference in each other's domestic affairs, (6) freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and (7) war reparations.[70]

The Iranians will insist as long as they can on adherence to the terms of the Algiers Agreement, which would preserve the pre–war border and compel ceding the disputed territory on the Central Front to Iraq (which occupied the territory in its 1988 counteroffensive campaign). This would also place the border on the southern 43 miles of the Shatt al–Arab along the center line of the shipping channel, also known as the Thalweg Line. The Iranians will be willing to withdraw behind such a border, repatriate all Iraqi POWs still held in Iran, and agree not to interfere in Iraq's domestic affairs (thus abandoning the Kurds for the second time). They are likely to hedge on the issue of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and will insist that Iraq be labeled the aggressor in the war and that Iraq and the Gulf Arab states pay Iran billions of dollars in war reparations.

The Iraqis will insist that the Algiers Agreement, which they signed under duress, is null and void. They will demand that the disputed territory on the Central Front (a traditional invasion route to Baghdad) be ceded to Iraq and that the boundary along the southern Shatt al–Arab be set along the eastern (Iranian) shore to insure Iraqi control of its sole waterway to the Gulf. They will agree to repatriate all Iranian POWs (insisting that *all* Iraqis held POW by Iran be returned, whether these POWs are willing or not) and to noninterference in Iranian domestic affairs (abandoning the Mujahedeen and the Iranian Kurds). The Iraqis will also drag their feet on the issue of war reparations until an amount can be settled on among the other Gulf states eager to buy off Iran. The Iraqis will, however, steadfastly refuse to be formally identified as the "aggressor" in this conflict.

Provided that some agreement can be reached on these issues over the next few months, the "peace" will hold until a permanent treaty can be signed. Each nation can then be expected to focus on its own internal political and economic reconstruction and development for a period of years: Japan's Institute of Middle Eastern Economics estimated that between 1981 and 1985, damage to the petroleum infrastructures produced oil revenue losses of $23 billion in Iran and $65.5 billion in Iraq. The Institute also estimated that, as of January 1988, wartime military expenses totaled $24.3 billion for Iran and $33 billion for Iraq.[71] Neither should be expected, however, to forego potent UW capabilities against each other. After a period of reconstruction, old animosities will again rise to the fore and the question will not be *whether*, but *when* and *to what degree* each will resume interference in the other's affairs short of conventional war. The Iranians and Iraqis have emerged from Phase III of the war with a large corps of UW personnel of substantial operational experience. Should negotiations stall into a state of "no war, no peace," these UW forces could be used to keep their enemies off balance and to maintain pressure to negotiate.

"The Iranians and Iraqis have emerged from...the war with a large corps of UW personnel...Should negotiations stall...these UW forces could be used to keep their enemies off balance..."

Lessons

To date, the war between Iran and Iraq has provided several basic object lessons in UW:

1. **Victory or defeat in war is measured not in terms of territory gained or lost, but in terms of destruction of the opponent's armed forces, its economic ability to wage war, and its will to fight.**[72]

2. **Conventional and unconventional modes of war are not mutually exclusive, but they are not necessarily complementary.** Much of the UW during the conventional phase of the fighting was unsynchronized, did not support the main, conventional effort and detracted from the main battle. Iran, for example, continued to wage UW on enemies all over the world with combat potential that would have been better invested in economy–of–force operations against key Iraqi political–military–economic targets.

3. **Among elite military formations, a force in which religious purity and political allegiance to the regime are given a higher priority than purely military leadership is no match against an otherwise equal force in which religion and politics are seconded to military competence.** The Iranians sacrificed military competence for ideological and religious purity when they purged their regular armed forces and when they set up their "elite" Pasadaran formations which, because of their greater political reliability, were used on more rear–area, UW operations than their regular military counterparts.

4. **UW forces are a perishable and essentially non–renewable resource.** A nation can, by definition, produce only a limited number of "elite" soldiers with the requisite physical and mental abilities for UW. When lost, such personnel are extremely difficult to replace over the short term without a lowering of standards and degradation in performance. In a long conventional phase of war, UW forces are thus more vulnerable to attrition than general–purpose forces are. Over–reliance on UW forces can quickly lead to their exhaustion, as may have happened among the Shiite underground in some Gulf states and has happened among the better Pasadaran units.

5. **UW operations in a conventional phase of war are not decisive in themselves, but may be operationally useful to divert enemy forces and resources from the main battle area: UW operations that are not closely tied to attainable strategic, operational or tactical goals are ineffective.** UW was not decisive in Phase III and was often counterproductive. Pasadaran raids on Gulf shipping and mining operations brought the U.S. Navy into the Gulf, which ultimately led to the neutralization of Iranian sea power. The Kurdish revolt in Iraq failed, causing thousands of refugees to flee to camps in Turkey and Iran that provide incubation for a new generation of terrorist–insurgents. The operations of *Al Dawa* in Iraq and the Mujahedeen in Iran were not tied to clear and attainable goals and often appeared to be action for action's sake.

6. **State–sponsored terrorism runs at cross–purposes with, and often negates, strategic PSYOP.** Long–standing Iranian complicity in terrorism, from the 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the 444–day ordeal of Americans taken hostage there to the criminal hijacking of Kuwaiti Airlines Flight 422, has negated the national Iranian PSYOP theme that it is the victim of various international injustices. Few in the world community shed a tear for the Iranian soldiers who, from late 1983 on, have been cruelly gassed to death in the thousands by Iraqi violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It was not until large numbers of civilians became casualties in 1988 that significant adverse world public opinion was expressed against Iraqi actions.[73] Similarly, Iran was singularly unable to gain world sympathy

for the tragic shooting down of Iran Air Flight 655 because world perception was that the Iranians *were* capable of using a commercial airliner full of civilians in a barbaric terrorist suicide attack in the Gulf. That Iran has come to grips with this lesson is suggested by its pressure on Hizbullah in late 1988 to release Western hostages held in Lebanon.[74]

7. **UW operations with strong psychological overtones, such as terrorism and guerrilla attacks, can be neutralized in totalitarian societies by state security repression before an incident and media suppression afterward.** Disregard of human rights, the lack of civil liberties, and total government control of the media in Iran and Iraq denied mass audiences to sensational attacks and attempts to provide alternate sources to government-supplied information.

8. **Simple and reliable logistics and secure lines of communications are essential to effective guerrilla warfare.** The efficiency and effectiveness of GW decreases in direct proportion to increasing logistical complexity and unreliability. The Kurdish revolt in Iraq increased in tempo once Iranian ground forces and Kurdish guerrillas linked up, when supplies could be passed directly and regularly from Iran to the Kurds. Once the Iraqi counterattack split the Kurds and the Iranians, and severed cross-border lines of communication, Kurdish combat strength declined as the Kurds were forced to resort to more circuitous and less reliable LOCs through third countries. Similarly, the deployment of UN troops between Iranian and Iraqi lines to enforce the Aug. 20 cease-fire successfully cut off the Mujahedeen operating in Iran from their logistics base in Iraq. As a result, Mujahedeen operations in the border region have been stifled.[75]



9. **Otherwise well-trained UW operators using low technology cannot defeat the professional application of appropriate high technology.** Threats to Gulf shipping from Iranian speedboats and minelayers were neutralized by the Iraqis and their Gulf allies, and the U.S. Navy, through the use of high-technology ground, air, space and maritime sensors and weaponry that denied the Iranians cover of darkness and the correspondent element of surprise.

10. **Tactical-operational UW forces employed on proper terrain can effectively locate enemy formations, collect battlefield intelligence behind enemy lines, divert and disperse enemy strength, and improve the correlation of forces for attacking or defending conventional forces. However, when detected or fixed, light UW forces must be extracted, reinforced or supported by heavier forces or by air to survive.** Iranian and Iraqi UW forces effectively infiltrated through marshes and mountains, but they were generally ineffective when operating in terrain trafficable by tanks and armored vehicles. Whenever such forces were located by the enemy and were unable to be extracted by, link up with, or be directly supported by heavier friendly forces within a few hours, they were extremely vulnerable to attack by enemy artillery, armor, mechanized infantry and aircraft. They were especially vulnerable to chemical weapons. For example, Pasadaran and Kurdish guerrilla units were effectively used to infiltrate behind and seize critical heights on the Northern Front, but they could not hold these positions in the face of sustained Iraqi counterattacks.

Conclusion

Iran has overplayed its UW card. The mullahs overestimated the potential of the Kurdish separatists and Shiite fundamentalists in Iraq. They also underestimated the efficiency of Iraqi state security and the potency of Iraqi counterinsurgency efforts. Generally lower levels of professional military expertise and a relative scarcity of heavy armaments and high technology have also caused the Iranians to favor the use of light, irregular forces on missions that could be better served by other means.

Iraq has underplayed UW in the conflict. The Iraqis did not effectively promote the development of latent incipient resistance to the Iranian regime into popular GW. Ethnic Arab nationalism in Khuzistan was not cultivated. Iraq never tapped the immense potential of the Iranian refugees. Mujahedeen terrorism did not garner popular support. The NLA was created too late in Phase III to transform internal Iranian opposition to the mullahs into a war of movement. The relatively conservative approach of Iraqi military leaders has also limited the employment of UW forces against the Iranian tactical-operational rear.

Attempts to split the populations from their respective governments along religious and ethnic lines could not overcome nationalist sentiments. Iraq was able to wage all-out war on Iran for eight years with a 70 percent Shiite army led by a Kurdish chief of staff. Iranian Arabs apparently fought alongside other Iranians against the Iraqis.

Similar Iranian attempts to galvanize fundamentalist resistance in the rest of the Gulf and overthrow "anti-Islamic" governments throughout the Middle East were similarly muted by the targeted governments. With the exception of the Syrian-protected enclave of the Bekaa Valley and the Hizbullah-controlled Beirut neighborhoods in Lebanon, the Iranians and their allies succeeded nowhere in transforming latent incipient resistance into open rebellion.



Thus, the underlying complexion of the struggle between the Persians and the Arabs has not changed in more than two dozen wars over 500 years, but countries outside the region are now third parties to the conflict. Although the sides may be exhausted at the moment, they are likely to continue struggling, albeit in unconventional ways and at lower intensities than in the past eight years. ✂

Capt. William H. Burgess III is a Special Forces officer currently stationed at Fort Richardson, Alaska. A graduate of the military intelligence officer advanced course, he holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Southeastern Massachusetts University, a master's degree in public administration from Clark University and a JD degree from American University.

Notes:

[1] John Pimlott, ed., *Guerrilla Warfare* (Hong Kong: The Military Press, 1985), pp. 134-36, 138; see also Gary Sick, *All Fall Down* (New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 202-3, 244.

[2] Shireen T. Hunter, "Iranian Sanctions Are Not the Answer; Iraq Was the Culprit," The *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 September 1987, p. 14.

[3] Stephen C. Pelletiere, "The Power of Iraq's Baath Party," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 29 September 1987, p. 11.

[4] See Scott MacLeod, "The Cries of the Kurds," *Time*, 19 September 1988, p. 33.

[5] Also known as Mujahedeen-Khalq.

[6] See Klaus Bering (Deutsche Press-Agentur), "After 7 Years, Iranian Capital Learns to Live With War," *Anchorage Daily News*, 3 October 1987, p. 8; Robin Wright, *Sacred Rage* (New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1985), p. 29; E.A. Wayne, "Khomeini Foes Fast in Bid for U.S. Support," pp. 3-4, and "Anti-Khomeini Mojahedin Gains Credibility Among U.S. Experts," p. 5, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 8 January 1988; E.A. Wayne, "Schulz's Moscow Agenda Includes Pressing Soviets on Gulf War," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 19 February 1988, p. 6; James Bruce, "NLA and the Struggle Against Tehran," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 20 February 1988, pp. 313-15; Tim Hodlin, "In Wartime Iran, Black Market and Anti-Iraq Feelings Flourish," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 11 March 1988, p. 12.

[7] Ronald V. Dellums, "The Critical Choices Facing Iran's Mullahs," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 2 June 1988, p. 13; Warren Richey, "Iraq is Winning Battles, But Wonders How to Win Peace," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 July 1988, pp. 9-10; Richey, "Anti-Khomeini Rebels Attack as Iran and Iraq Prepare to Talk," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 27 July 1988, p. 9; E.A. Wayne, "Iranian Opposition Bids for Power," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 28 July 1988, pp. 3, 6.

[8] Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983), p. 74.

[9] Christopher David, "The Role of 'Special' Forces in the Gulf War," *Special Forces*, February 1988, pp. 56-59.

[10] The overall leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps was Mohsen Rafiqdoust until the late-summer, early-autumn 1988 Iranian cabinet crisis. The post was vacant as of October 1988. Rafiqdoust had held ministerial rank in the Iranian government. The IRGC is commanded by Mohsein Razai. Current strength of the IRGC is approximately 350,000, making it slightly larger than the regular Iranian Army. Robin Wright, "Iran's Armed Forces: the Battle Within," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 26 August 1987, pp. 1,8; Joseph L. Galloway, et al., "Iran: Scuffling in the Wheelhouse," *U.S. News & World Report*, 12 October 1987; p. 40; Salah Nasrawi (AP), "Iraqis Say Missile Kills Six Children," *Anchorage Daily News*, 9 November 1987, pp. 1, A10; Claude van England, "Iran Policy Change Behind Cabinet Crisis," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 16 September 1988, p. 11.

[11] Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *State Sponsored Terrorism*, June 1985.

[12] Wright, *Sacred Rage*, pp. 32-36.

[13] Wright, *Sacred Rage*, p. 33.

[14] David Segal, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1988, p. 947.

[15] "Iran Claims Attack Near Kirkuk Oil Center," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 26 February 1988, p. 2.

[16] Claude van England, "Iran Sets Condition for Accepting Gulf Cease-fire," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9 September 1987, pp. 1, 11; Warren Richey, "Finger Pointing Begins Anew in Debate Over Who Started Gulf War," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9 September 1987, p. 11; Segal, *Iran-Iraq War*, p. 947.

[17] Segal, *Iran-Iraq War*, p. 947.

[18] Hamza Kaidi, "The Iraqis of the Iranian Revolution," *Jeune Afrique*, 25 January 1984 (undated English translation).

[19] Segal, *Iran-Iraq War*, p. 948.

[20] Warren Richey, "U.S. Moves in Gulf Could Backfire, Commercial Shippers Warn," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 30 June 1987, pp. 1, 36.

[21] Warren Richey, "Dangers Stalk Tankers in Gulf," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 2 July 1987, pp. 1, 44; Richey, "French Captain Recounts Iranian Attack in Gulf," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 6 October 1987, p. 11; Nabila Megalli (AP), "Iranian Boat Attacks Tanker," *Anchorage Daily News*, 24 October 1987, p. A9.

[22] Warren Richey, "Basra Journal: Among Shiites in Iraqi Front-line City, There's Little Sympathy for Iran," *The Christian*

Science Monitor, 21 September 1987, pp. 9, 12. Boghammar Marin speedboats have been used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Gulf since February 1987. As provided by the manufacturer, each of these boats has a maximum speed of 45 knots and a range of 500 nautical miles, according to "Swedish Speedboats in the Gulf," *International Defense Review*, September 1987, p. 1137.

[23] Ed Magnuson, "'We Engaged,'" *Time*, 19 October 1987, pp. 12–14.

[24] *CBS Evening News*, 22 October 1987.

[25] Michael S. Serrill, "Back to the Bullets," *Time*, 14 September 1987, p. 38; John H. Cushman Jr. (The New York Times), "U.S. Copters Sink 3 Iranian Vessels," *Anchorage Daily News*, 9 October 1987, pp. 1, A12; Richard Pyle (AP), "Iraqi Planes Pelt Iran Oil Centers," *Anchorage Daily News*, 11 October 1987, p. A6.

[26] *Newsweek*, 14 September 1987, p. 44.

[27] *Time*, 14 September 1987, p. 38; *U.S. News & World Report*, 19 October 1987, p. 8; *Time*, 19 October 1987, p. 12; *Soldier of Fortune*, December 1987, p. 51.

[28] Richard Pyle (AP), "Secret Choppers Hit Iranians," *Anchorage Daily News*, 10 October 1987, pp. 1, A12; *Headline News*, Cable News Network, 10 October 1987; *For Your Eyes Only* 174, 12 October 1987, p. 1; Sara Fritz (Los Angeles Times), "Iran Threatens U.S. With Own Stinger Rockets," *Anchorage Daily News*, 12 October 1987, p. A3; Associated Press, "Divers Discover Stinger Missiles on Iranian Boat," *Anchorage Daily News*, 2 February 1988, p. A8. The Iranians may have acquired the missiles in the spring of 1987, according to John M. Broder (Los Angeles Times), "Study Says Army 'Lax' on Security," *Anchorage Daily News*, 22 October 1987, pp. 1, A10; *CBS Evening News*, 2 November 1987, alleged the Iranians acquired about 20 Stingers in June–July 1987 from Afghan Mujahedeen guerrillas. Many Afghan groups deny they sold the missiles to the Iranians, according to Edward Giradet, "Afghan Resistance Stung by Charges of Arms Trafficking to Iran," *For Your Eyes Only* 177, 23 November 1987, p. 1; Giradet, "The Alchemy of Turning Guns into Luxury Villas," *U.S. News & World Report*, 30 November 1987, p. 36.

[29] See Warren Richey, "Gulf Sinking Highlights Potential Dangers," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 11 December 1987, p. 12.

[30] Russell Watson, et al., "In the Gulf, Nowhere to Hide," *Newsweek*, 14 September 1987, pp. 44–45.

[31] Bryan Brumley, "Dozen Mines Swept from Kuwaiti Port Entrances," *Anchorage Daily News*, 2 July 1987, p. A7; Warren Richey, "Mine 'Warfare' in Gulf Suits Iran's Political and Military Gains," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 12 August 1987, pp. 7, 9.

[32] "Another Mine Found Outside Gulf," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 13 August 1987, p. 2; Peter Grier, "Navy Lags in Mine-hunting Technology," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 14 August 1987, pp. 1, 32.

[33] Molly Moore, "U.S. Helicopters Attack Iranian Ship," *Anchorage Daily News*, 22 September 1987, pp. 1, A12; Norman Black, "Pentagon Says Ship Tracked Before Strike," *Anchorage Daily News*, 23 September 1987, pp. 1, A10; Patrick E. Tyler, "Navy Releases Iranians," *Anchorage Daily News*, 27 September 1987, pp. 1, A9; *For Your Eyes Only* 173, 28 September 1987, p. 1; William Matthews, "'Joint' Effort Credited in U.S. Attack in Gulf," *Army Times*, 5 October 1987, pp. 6, 43, 45; Russell Watson and John Barry, "A U.S. Ambush in the Gulf," *Newsweek*, 5 October 1987, pp. 24–27; Ed Magnuson, "Caught in the Act," *Time*, 5 October 1987, pp. 20–23.

[34] Richard Pyle (AP), "Secret Choppers Hit Iranians," *Anchorage Daily News*, 10 October 1987, pp. 1, A12.

[35] William E. Smith, "Running the Gauntlet," *Time*, 3 August 1987, pp. 24–27.

[36] Loren Jenkins, "Iran Sends Minesweepers into Gulf of Oman, Says Ships in Danger," *Anchorage Daily News*, 15 August 1987, p. A9.

[37] Robin Wright, "Iran Takes Wait-and-see Stance on U.S. Gulf Moves," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 17 August 1987, pp. 1, 10.

[38] *Headline News*, Cable News Network, 3 October 1987; Associated Press, "Aircraft Chase Gulf Speedboats," *Anchorage Daily News*, 3 October 1987, p. A6; Warren Richey, "Iran's Retaliation for Iraqi Raids Brings Flurry of Activity in Gulf," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 October 1987, p. 11.

[39] *For Your Eyes Only* 174, 12 October 1987, p. 1; "Tornado Attack," *Newsweek*, 12 October 1987, p. 51.

[40] Richard Pyle (AP), "'Secret' Barges Provide U.S. With Floating Bases in the Gulf," *Anchorage Daily News*, 2 August 1988, p. A6.

[41] Richard Pyle (AP), "Secret Choppers Hit Iranians," *Anchorage Daily News*, 10 October 1987, pp. 1, A12.

[42] Charles Waterman, "Analysis of Naval Power: Assumed But Unproved," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 4 August 1987, pp. 1, 28.

[43] Allegedly, Islamic Jihad has recently emerged in territories occupied by Israel, according to Joel Greenberg, "New Breed of Resistance to Israeli Occupation," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 14 October 1987, pp. 1, 32; "Israelis Report Smashing Gaza Guerrilla Network," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 15 October 1987, p. 2; John Barnes, "Israel Confronts a Bolder Enemy," *U.S. News & World Report*, 25 January 1988, pp. 48–49; Greenberg, "Changing Face of Arab Unrest," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9 March 1988, pp. 1, 8; Johanna McGeary, "Who's Running the Insurrection?," *Time*, 23 May 1988, p. 31; McGeary, "Behind Barbed Wire," *Time*, 13 June 1988, pp. 34–35; George D. Moffett III, "Flames of Palestinian Unrest Threaten Israel With Rash of Fires," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 15 June 1988, p. 9; Moffett, "Palestinian Uprising: Phase 2," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 17 June 1988, p. 12; McGeary, "Rebellion With a Cause," *Time*, 15 August 1988, p. 24; Greenberg, "Fundamentalists Battle PLO to Control Uprising Against Israel," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 13 September 1988, pp. 1, 32; Glenn Frankel (The Washington Post), "Fundamentalists Seize Role in Palestinian Uprising," *Anchorage Daily News*, 25 September 1988, p. A13. Note also the emergence of the Islamic Tendency Movement in Tunisia, according to E.A. Wayne, "U.S. Pleased With Tunisia's Early Changes," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 12 November 1987, p. 7.

[44] Wright, *Sacred Rage*, pp. 26–29.

[45] Mohamed Selhami, "I Have Met the 'Suicide Men,'" *Jeune Afrique*, 25 January 1984 (undated English translation); E.A. Wayne, "After Iran Threats, West Eyes Hizbullah," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 August 1987, pp. 3, 5; Norman Kempster, "U.S. Says Iran Plans Terrorism," *Anchorage Daily News*, 15 August 1987, pp. 1, A14.

[46] Jim Muir, "Lebanese Irony: How Economic Woes Aid Shiite Radicals," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 17 December 1987, pp. 7–8; Joseph Galloway, et al., "What Khomeini Will Do Next," *U.S. News & World Report*, 2 May 1988, pp. 35–38, 43.

[47] Augustus Richard Norton, "Hizbullah, Under Iran's Thumb?," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 4 August 1988, p. 12.

[48] William O. Beeman, "Iran's Revolution: Cog in the Wheel of Islamic Movement," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 26 July 1988, pp. 1, 32; Claude van England, "Signs Grow of Iranian Disenchantment With Hizbullah," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 August 1988, p. 9.

[49] Brian Duffy, et al., "Bloody Beirut -- Trading in Lives," *U.S. News & World Report*, 9 February 1987, pp. 24–29; "Captive Freed After 11 Months," *Anchorage Daily News*, 15 August 1987, p. A12; Farouk Nassar, "U.S. Journalist Held in Lebanon Escapes Captors," *Anchorage Daily News*, 18 August 1987, p. A3; E.A. Wayne, "Hostage Surprise Not Likely," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 21 October 1988, pp. 1, 6.

[50] Robin Wright, "Tracing the Emergence of Shiite Activism in the Middle East," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 3 August 1987, p. 20; Wright, *Sacred Rage*, pp. 82–83, 95.

[51] E.A. Wayne, "Iranian Tactics Anger Saudis," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 27 April 1988, pp. 1, 32; Warren Richey, "Blast Rips Saudi Airline Ticket Office One Day After Iranian Ties Severed," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 28 April 1988, p. 10.

[52] E.A. Wayne, "Militias Cooperate on Drug Trade to Pay for War -- Against Each Other," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9 March 1988, pp. 1, 28.

[53] Wright, *Sacred Rage*, pp. 114–119.

[54] Warren Richey, "Trail of Bahrain Sabotage Investigation Seen Leading to Iran," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 6 January 1988, pp. 7, 9.

[55] Wright, *Sacred Rage*, p. 145.

[56] John Barnes, "Kuwait Rolls the Dice for High Stakes," *U.S. News & World Report*, 3 August 1987, p. 30; "Kuwait: Between Iraq and a Hard Place," *Time*, 3 August 1987, p. 26.

[57] Wright, *Sacred Rage*, pp. 112–113, 121–133.

[58] Warren Richey, "Iran Shows No Signs of Backing Down," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 17 July 1987, pp. 9, 11.

[59] Wright, *Sacred Rage*, pp. 146–48.

[60] Wright, *Sacred Rage*, pp. 167–68.

[61] Warren Richey, "Saudis Extend Qualified Welcome to Iranian Worshipers," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9 March 1988, p. 9.

[62] Loren Jenkins, "Blast Rips Saudi Gas Plant; Mine Sinks Ship," *Anchorage Daily News*, 16 August 1987, pp. 1, A12; Claude van England, "War's Economic and Human Costs Prompt Iran to Explore New Tactics," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 25 August 1987, p. 8; "Washington Whispers," *U.S. News & World Report*, 31 August 1987, p. 15.

[63] Warren Richey, "Mecca Violence Threatens to Widen Conflict," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 3 August 1987, pp. 1, 25; Robin Wright, "Mecca Clash Has Deeper Roots in Islamic Schism," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 7 August 1987, p. 10; William L. Chaze, et al., "The Dangers Deepen, and So Do the Doubts," *U.S. News & World Report*, 17 August 1987, pp. 18–23; "Washington Whispers," *U.S. News & World Report*, 7 September 1987, p. 14; Francis X. Clines, "Saudis Get Tough with Iran," *Anchorage Daily News*, 29 August 1987, pp. 1, A16.

[64] John Barnes, "Kurds Locked in One More Losing War?," *U.S. News & World Report*, 9 November 1987, p. 55.

[65] John Barnes, "Iraq's No-win, No-lose War?," *U.S. News & World Report*, 12 October 1987, pp. 38–39.

[66] Warren Richey, "Iraqi Leader Fans Nationalist Pride to Offset Iran's Appeal to Shiites," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 29 September 1987, pp. 7–8.

[67] Segal, *Iran-Iraq War*, pp. 951–53.

[68] A good representation of the parallel, strategic propaganda themes pursued by the Iraqis is found in a commentary by the Iraqi ambassador to the United States, Nizar Hamdoon, "An Iranian Government for All the People," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 3 August 1987, p. 14.

[69] The Iranians attempt to counter this by maintaining close ties with Arab Syria, which is also their gateway to Lebanon.

[70] See Paul Lewis (The New York Times), "Gulf Peace Talks Stall as Iraq Lays Claim to Waterway," *Anchorage Daily News*, 29 August 1988, p. A6; Associated Press, "Waterway Dispute Halts Negotiations in Gulf Cease-fire," *Anchorage Daily News*, 30 August 1988, p. A6; Patrick E. Tyler (The Washington Post), "Iran Opposes Iraqi Claims to Waterway," *Anchorage Daily News*, 31 August 1988, p. A8; Tyler, "Mediation Team Changes Leaders in Gulf Deadlock," *Anchorage Daily News*, 2 September 1988, p. A6; Associated Press, "Iran, Iraq Trade Accusations; Talks Stalled," *Anchorage Daily News*, 3 September 1988, p. A6; John Rice (AP), "Iraq Accuses Iran of Stalling Talks, Gives Kurds Amnesty," *Anchorage Daily News*, 7 September 1988, p. A6.

[71] John K. Cooley, "Repairing the Damage in Iran and Iraq," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 1 August 1988, p. 7.

[72] See Segal, *Iran-Iraq War*, p. 948.

[73] See "Operation Crush Kurds," *U.S. News & World Report*, 19 September 1988, p. 8; Scott MacLeod, "The Cries of the Kurds," *Time*, 19 September 1988, p. 33; Jill Smolowe, "Where is the Outrage?," *Time*, 26 September 1988, p. 36.

[74] Associated Press, "Anglican Bishop Says Iran Ready to Release Hostages," *Anchorage Daily News*, 30 August 1988, p. A6; Jim Muir, "Iran Proves Influence in Lebanon," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 14 September 1988; E.A. Wayne, "Freeing of Latest Hostage Feeds Speculation on Others to Follow," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 15 September 1988, p. 5; Claude van England, "Iran Said to Push for Hostages' Release," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 4 October 1988, pp. 1, 10; Jim Muir, "Kidnappers Concede Little," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 October 1988, p. 7; E.A. Wayne, "U.S. Tries to Determine Why Hostage Released," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 October 1988, pp. 3, 4.

[75] See Claude van England, "Gulf Cease-fire Poses Challenge to Iranians Opposed to Khomeini," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 8 September 1988, p. 9.

A Common-Sense Approach to

Psychological Operations

by CWO2 Scott S. Herbert & Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr.

PSYOP, the authors argue, is common sense with a military application. In the battle for the mind, the arsenal is limited only by the imagination.

When President Reagan sent American air and naval forces into Libya on April 15, 1986, the bombs dropped by our aircraft carried a message to Col. Muammar Khadafy more articulate than mere words.

The U.S. raid was a psychological operation aimed at influencing the thought processes of the Libyan leader. The message apparently got through -- following the raid, Khadafy's support to the international terrorist community noticeably dropped, or at least went further underground.

This is the kind of war which is little understood, a psychological war where the military is just one weapon in an arsenal of possibilities limited only by one's imagination and training. For our elected leadership, the psychology of our adversaries is of overwhelming importance. It should be no less so for our nation's military. Wars are ultimately won, or lost, in minds and not on the battlefield.

For various reasons, there are many in our modern Army who think of PSYOP as an esoteric field characterized by leaflets, posters and loudspeakers; a game played by overeducated, underemployed, unnecessary soldiers. The feeling is pervasive among many of our warfighters that PSYOP is not essential to win battles or wars. This misperception will not stand the light of reason.

In fact, we develop a better warfighting concept if we adjust our perspective and make the conduct of PSYOP doctrinally more important than battles. A solid case can be made that the use of military force is only a technique of PSYOP and that the only purpose of armed forces, of warriors, is to influence an enemy -- to convince him of the futility of his actions or to break his will to fight. Wars can be prevented by PSYOP alone, without applying military force, and we call these actions deterrence.

One of our more colorful presidents, Teddy Roosevelt, the former "Roughrider," defined the word deterrence when he advised us to "speak softly and carry a big stick." Roosevelt sent America's Great White Fleet around the world to demonstrate our ability to enforce our policy decisions by military means. More recently, a quarantine of Cuba convinced the Soviet Union of our intent to enforce the Monroe Doctrine -- with military force if necessary.

Even the bombing raid on Libya had a PSYOP effect on the rest of the Middle East by demonstrating our resolve to act. In each of these cases, our military activities prevented armed conflicts. Unfortunately, many in the military see these events as incomplete military actions (since no battle ensued) rather than as completed PSYOP actions. Again, there is a lack of understanding about the real purpose of a fighting force.

Many of history's finest military thinkers have had a better grasp of the value of PSYOP than we have today. Sun Tzu, a Chinese general who lived 2,500 years ago, said, "All warfare is based on deception," and "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." Clausewitz asserted that "Psychological forces exert a decisive influence on the elements involved in war." Mao Tse-Tung put forth the concept that "...weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive one; it is man and not materials that counts." Even in the United States' most recent conflict, the Vietnam War, General Vo Nguyen Giap of the North Vietnamese Army said, "In preparing for armed insurrection, propaganda is the most essential task to be performed. During the insurrection, propaganda is even more important than fighting." Still, there is little evidence that we have taken these lessons to heart.

Throughout history, the psychological impact of battles has usually been an accidental result of events rather than a planned effect. Interestingly, many of the most significant military events, those most often cited by our military historians as classic examples of military success, are significant primarily from a psychological perspective. It was their psychological impact that made them significant. When 300 Spartans fought the great Persian army at the pass of Thermopylae, it was the psychological impact of their battle that was memorable, not their warrior prowess.

The effects of Hannibal's elephants, Caesar's legions marching in unison and the charge of mounted knights in the Middle Ages were all



"The German Luftwaffe went so far as to attach wind-driven noise makers to the JU-87 (Stuka) dive bombers so that their enemies could hear, and be terrified by, the screams of diving warplanes."

psychological in nature. Germany's "blitzkrieg," or lightning war, of World War II was designed to shock the enemy as much psychologically as tactically. The German Luftwaffe went so far as to attach wind-driven noise makers to the JU-87 (Stuka) dive bombers so that their enemies could hear, and be terrified by, the screams of diving warplanes. When an American commander, cut off and surrounded at Bastogne, was asked to surrender, he replied, "Nuts!" -- that's PSYOP.

Psychological operations are not mysterious. In fact, PSYOP is more common sense than many might believe. In 1942, still reeling from the devastating blow at Pearl Harbor, the United States launched an extremely risky psychological operation, the Doolittle raid on Tokyo. The success of that raid, though of little significance to the warfighting abilities of the Japanese, had a devastating effect on the Japanese people. The Japanese had been told by their government that Japan was invulnerable to attack. Therefore, the psychological effects of this one small raid were greatly magnified. Not surprisingly, the Japanese military was forced to divert much-needed air-defense assets to protect the Japanese homeland. In addition, our people in the United States got a much-needed boost to their morale -- that's PSYOP.

In 1944, the Allies implemented a major deception plan. A phoney invasion force was constructed around the dynamic persona of Gen. George Patton. The apparent aim of this contrived force was to attack the German defenses across the English Channel at the Pas de Calais. The operation was designed to influence Adolf Hitler, who personally approved force dispositions along the English Channel. This "deception" caused Hitler to divert German forces and resulted in the allies being able to launch a successful invasion at Normandy -- that's PSYOP.

In 1968, the North Vietnamese Army and its allies, the Viet Cong, launched a bold countrywide attack. This operation, which proved to be a tactical defeat, was a strategic victory which announced the beginning of the end of the Vietnam conflict. The North Vietnamese had already found that they could not defeat the technologically and tactically superior American and South Vietnamese forces on the battlefields of Vietnam. They knew they had to conduct psychological operations in



"The well–designed, artfully executed Japanese attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor failed to accomplish a major portion of its operational strategy because of inadequate PSYOP planning...The unplanned psychological effect of the 'sneak attack' mobilized the American population as nothing else could have."

the living rooms of the American people to be successful. Tet '68 was the turning point of the war -- that's PSYOP.

While we have listed several examples of successful operations which demonstrate the need to make PSYOP an integral part of every military planning process, there are also examples of failures, examples where a PSYOP message caused the originator more harm than good because of inadequate planning or insufficient control of the situation. The well–designed, artfully executed Japanese attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor failed to accomplish a major portion of its operational strategy because of inadequate PSYOP planning. The Japanese plan was to present a declaration of war to the United States shortly before the attack on the fleet and thereby deliver a devastating blow to the Pacific Fleet and the American psyche. Because of an elevated security requirement accompanying the declaration of war, the message was handled by inexperienced personnel. Their lack of decrypting speed caused the declaration of war to be delivered *after the Pearl Harbor attack*. The unplanned psychological effect of the "sneak attack" mobilized the American population as nothing else could have.

On a different front, Adolf Hitler's grand plan to destroy Great Britain's will to fight by bombing the cities failed because he was unable to account for the brilliant countermaneuverings of the British prime minister, Sir Winston Churchill. Churchill, an astute observer of human nature and the consummate politician, rallied the population to withstand his self–proclaimed "Battle of Britain," turning a potentially devastating blow to England into a defeat for Germany. Notwithstanding the courage of English and allied fliers, the "Battle of Britain" is remembered today more as a psychological than a military success.

In reality, PSYOP is nothing more than common–sense human relations given a military application -- common sense by design. We all use PSYOP, and we use it all the time. A handshake and smile, a pat on the back or a thumbs–up are all examples of common–sense PSYOP. In every case, the act is designed to have a specific psychological effect on the person or persons who receive it. Certainly, we should apply at least as much thought to the life–and–death world of warfighting.

If PSYOP is so easy, such common sense, and so much a part of everyday life, why do we need to train anyone in its use? The easiest answer is that not all of us are equally endowed with much common sense, but that isn't the best answer. What we teach in PSYOP training are the tools and techniques necessary to conduct military PSYOP.

Low–intensity conflict is as much psychological, political, and economic as it is military. The focus in LIC is, and will likely remain, in the Third World. For PSYOP to be effective in this environment, it must take into account the language and culture of the target audience. Although PSYOP is mostly common sense, the "how" of PSYOP can be very complex. The expected effects of military PSYOP must be weighed against the effect on third parties, such as local civilians and world opinion, as well as on our own population.

To accomplish this, our Army trains PSYOP soldiers in the languages and cultures of peoples in areas where American troops may have to operate. In addition, new technologies in print, audio, and visual media demand more specialists in order to harness the best available means to accomplish tactical, operational or strategic psychological goals. These means -- radio, television, leaflets and other techniques -- get the desired message to the target audience. The goal is to influence an audience to act, or not act, in ways which will support the commander's intent, and without risking American lives.

But PSYOP is not only near–term, practical applications. PSYOP is the use of PSYOP–trained officers on staffs at every level to ensure that all commanders have the ability to consider the ramifications of their military actions. Burning down the hut is not always the best way to convince an enemy that we are the good guys.

Today only Special Forces units routinely consider the implications of their actions. At the lowest level, the Special Forces A–detachment conducts a psychological assessment as a normal part of its target analysis. The acronym CARVER describes this process; the detachment assesses the *criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect* and *recognizability* of any target before making the decision to attack it. Most significant here is the assessment of *effect*, which means the effect the operation will likely have on the local populace -- will they become more or less pro–U.S.? If the *effect* is not positive, the target will not be attacked. Only when the *criticality* of the target outweighs any negative impact will this rule be broken. Never is an operation conducted without such an assessment. If Special Forces ODAs evaluate their operations so routinely, shouldn't higher–level elements, with large planning staffs, be as thorough?

It should be clear that PSYOP is not performed behind "green doors" by pipe–smoking academics. The conduct of PSYOP is a warfighting skill which must be planned and practiced in order to be effective. Commanders at all levels, from national to squad or detachment, must train their subordinates and themselves to think in terms of psychological effect. Once an adversary *thinks* he is beaten, he *is* beaten. How to convince your enemy that he is beaten is PSYOP.

"PSYOP is not only near–term, practical applications. PSYOP is the use of PSYOP–trained officers on staffs at every level to ensure that all commanders have the ability to consider the ramifications of their military actions. Burning down the hut is not always the best way to convince an enemy that we are the good guys."

The key to PSYOP is that it is common sense with a military application. Any opportunity to change the thought processes of a target audience should never be passed up -- that's PSYOP. ✂

CWO2 Scott S. Herbert is the Warrant Officer Manager for the Special Operations Proponency Office at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. He was one of the first appointed Special Forces Technicians in 1984. Mr. Herbert has served as a Special Forces soldier with the 1st, 5th, 6th and 10th SF Groups. His enlisted experience includes training as a radio operator, a medic and an intelligence NCO. His last assignment was as an A–detachment commander in the 1st SF Group.

Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr. is the former deputy chief and Functional Area 39 manager in the Special Operations Proponency Office. He is currently taking language training en route to duty in the Middle East as a United Nations military observer. A former Special Forces NCO, Maj. Adolph was commissioned in the Military Intelligence Branch in 1976 and rebranched into Special Forces in 1987. He has served troop assignments with the 525th MI Group, commanded a Special Forces underwater operations detachment and served as a battalion intelligence officer in the 5th SF Group. He is a graduate of the MI Officer Advanced Course and the Foreign Area Officer Course.

Mosby:

The Model Partisan



Valentine Museum, Richmond, Virginia

by James J. Worsham and Maj. R.B. Anderson

During the Civil War, a man called the Gray Ghost ruled a three-county area known as "Mosby's Confederacy" just outside of his enemy's capital. Col. John Mosby and his 300 partisan rangers tied down five Union divisions. They wrecked railroads, captured wagon trains, raided headquarters, and disrupted communications and plans. They played Robin Hood to the local populace by protecting them from marauding Union soldiers and by sharing their captured wealth with those in need. The Gray Ghost and his partisan rangers provide us with an outstanding example of how to conduct partisan operations.

Mosby's force was both professional and mercenary. It was professional in that the men were selected volunteers who were well-trained and well-disciplined. They operated behind the lines but not above military law.

They were also soldiers of fortune in the sense that, unlike regulars, they were able to enjoy the spoils of war under the Confederacy's Partisan Ranger Act of 1862. The Act permitted partisan ranger units to operate behind the lines in enemy-occupied territory, supplementing their pay by their raids and taking their pick of captured Union equipment and supplies. Mosby's rangers were the best-equipped, best-clothed, and best-mounted cavalry unit in either nation. Indeed, because of their finery, Mosby's private soldiers were often mistaken for officers.

Before the war's end, the Confederacy had either denounced, disbanded, or incorporated into the regular army all rangers except those under Mosby's command. According to both Gen. Robert E. Lee and Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, Mosby's ranger unit was the only one that ever accomplished its intended mission. Indeed, Mosby's operations serve as a model of the three functions of partisan warfare: weakening the enemy's front line, weakening the enemy's infrastructure and winning the support of the people. Why did Mosby succeed and the rest fail? The answer lies in his men, his methods and his leadership.

John Singleton Mosby

He did not look much like a legend. Standing only 5 feet 8 inches tall, he weighed just 125 pounds. He was thin and wiry, with his shoulders slightly stooped. His hair was a sandy brown and he had a fair complexion. He wore high, black cavalry boots that came up past his knees; his two huge Colt army revolvers looked ill-proportioned to his small size. To the casual observer, he would appear to be just another Virginia lawyer or legislator who, more out of patriotism than preparedness, had donned the uniform of a Confederate officer. Only his eyes, which flashed restlessly when he talked, tended to betray the real man.

Mosby grew up near Charlottesville, Va. His boyhood hero was General Francis Marion, the famed "Swamp Fox" of South Carolina. As a ranger leader, Mosby was able to rival the legendary exploits of this Revolutionary War partisan.

As a youth, Mosby never let his size become a reason for being submissive to anyone. Once he was confronted by a bully who had a reputation for violence. Mosby was expecting trouble and was prepared to compensate for any size difference. When his opponent made a threatening move toward him, Mosby drew a pistol and shot him. The bully lived, but Mosby was sentenced to jail. Undaunted, he was soon reading law books and using the solitude of his cell to begin his legal education. Freed short of his six months' sentence for fear that confinement would endanger his "frail health," Mosby continued to pursue his legal training. Within five years, he was admitted to the bar and set up his legal practice in Bristol, Va.

What may have later surprised the people of Bristol was not that he had fighting ability or even physical toughness, but that he was fighting for the Confederacy. Although his father was a slave holder, Mosby made no secret that he adamantly opposed slavery. He had even told friends that if war came, he would fight for the Union. Yet, like Lee, he could not raise his sword against Virginia. When she was invaded, he enlisted as a private in a militia cavalry company.

As the war progressed, Mosby distinguished himself and became a scout for General Stuart in the spring of 1862. Stuart was further impressed by the young soldier and attempted to get him a commission as captain of a company of sharpshooters -- yet the promotion for this command never materialized.

In January of 1863, General Stuart gave Mosby the chance to work with a small independent command. While visiting some friends in Fairfax County (which borders the District of Columbia). Stuart made the gesture of leaving Mosby and a detachment of nine men behind for a few days to protect the locals from Union foragers, deserters and outlaws.

From such a small beginning, Mosby soon proved the value of his staying for more than a "few days." Reinforced by other Confederates who were home on leave or convalescing from wounds, Mosby, with his "Conglomerates" as he called them, rapidly made a name for himself. By carefully selecting his men and by setting the example, he proved himself to be an effective partisan and finally received his commission as a lieutenant. Before the war was over, Mosby was a colonel, and he and the 43rd Virginia Partisan Ranger Battalion had made history.

"...Mosby was busy forming his command ...when other ranger units were being disbanded...Mosby alone succeeded because he knew that special license and special privilege require special men and special discipline."

It is ironic that Mosby was busy forming his command at a time when other ranger units were being disbanded. The Confederates experienced great problems with their partisans. Two of the complaints are classic and are leveled at Special Forces today: First, that unconventional warfare takes good troops out of regular service. Second, that because unconventional warriors enjoy latitude and privilege, they cause dissatisfaction in the regular ranks. The foremost charge against the partisan rangers, however, was the lack of discipline, order, and organization. General Lee wrote "...the system gives license to many deserters and marauders, who assume to belong to authorized companies and commit depredation to friends and foe alike...With the single exception mentioned (Mosby), I hope the order will be issued at once disbanding the companies and battalions serving in this department."

These same problems can still be seen today in countless Third World brushfire wars. Most revolutions, even noble endeavors, attract a number of rogues who use their charter to achieve their own ends, thereby bringing discredit to their cause.

In his day, Mosby alone succeeded because he knew that special license and special privilege require special men and special discipline. Mosby had a way of enforcing his rules and was always ready to hear complaints of violations from either officers, soldiers, or civilians. Those found guilty were immediately punished and transferred back to the regulars.

Another reason for his success was his personal example. John Munson, one of his rangers, observed, "No man in the command was nearer to the thick of that fight than Mosby himself. There was no room to lead a charge, and the chief got right in the middle. I saw him weaving in and out of the fighting mass like a ferret, fighting hand-to-hand with every man who would stand before him. His fine mare was shot early in the action, and he sat her firmly throughout the entire fight, though she was on three legs only."

Yet there was a price to be paid for his enthusiasm for combat. Mosby was wounded five times during the war, three times seriously. Somehow he always seemed, within a few weeks, to be back in the saddle.

Mosby's rangers

Like most military organizations, Mosby's rangers were made up of men with varied backgrounds. Rich tidewater planters rode with poor mountain farmers. There were also the likes of bankers, lawyers and gentleman adventurers. The most

important recruits to Mosby were the northern–Virginia natives who knew the area.

The most notable characteristic about the command was its youth. Many of the rangers were teen–age soldiers. Mosby once commented that to these youths he owed part of his success; because they didn't bear the burdens of wives and children, they didn't worry with the consequences of their daring. Reflexes, skill and endurance were other traits of youth that, under the control of a skillful leader, made these boy–soldiers most effective rangers.

In contrast to the many boys in the rangers, there were also some combat veterans. In fact, several former officers, after becoming bored with the regulars, were serving under Mosby as privates. Others had been officers in foreign armies, such as a Captain Hoskins, who had earned a British medal for bravery in the Crimean War. Also with Mosby was Baron Robert von Masse, a Prussian officer who was later to serve as General of the German Ninth Cavalry.

Mosby didn't consider a man for membership unless he wanted to be in the rangers badly enough to come see him personally. He had seen the disastrous results of other partisan units which had become filled with deserters who had left the drudgery of the regular army for the adventure and spoils of the rangers. Mosby had no need of such men and was exceptionally careful about whom he allowed to join.

When the rangers scattered after a raid, they were on their own. Therefore, Mosby insisted on three rules of self–discipline: the men had to be on time at the rendezvous; they had to conduct themselves as soldiers on duty; and they were to conduct themselves as gentlemen off duty. A more temperate group of soldiers would be difficult to find.

One reason is that Mosby didn't tolerate drunkeness. However, according to John Munson, the main reason for their abstinence was that "...no man among us could afford to muddle his brain with drink, for he needed his wits at all times."

In addition to discipline, Mosby trained his men in hardship. He didn't want the "sunshine patriots" that plagued other ranger units. When adversity strikes, a commander doesn't need troops who feel sorry for themselves. There is a need to practice being miserable.

Equipment

The standard ranger uniform included two .44–caliber Colt army revolvers. Some even carried an extra pair of these revolvers in saddle holsters. A few also carried captured carbines. Just as important as the weapon itself is the way it is used. Since the Union soldiers kept them well–supplied with ammo, Mosby's rangers practiced often and were all good shots. In combat it was not unheard of for a ranger to fire six shots and empty five saddles.

"Since the Union soldiers kept them well–supplied with ammo, Mosby's rangers practiced often and were all good shots. In combat it was not unheard of for a ranger to fire six shots and empty five saddles."

Pursuers were often blasted with shotgun–like loads of grapeshot or cannister from a small but formidable 12–pound mountain howitzer. Mosby also used solid shot with this weapon for locomotives and for distance shots against large bodies of troops.

Perhaps the rangers' most valuable weapons were their horses. Indeed, food for the horses most often took precedence over food for the men. Captured corn was strategically stored throughout the area for future use. With a large number of captured horses available, Mosby required each ranger to keep at least one extra horse wherever it would be safe.

Tactics and techniques

Considering the great odds against them, it is surprising that the rangers did not lose more men than they did. In fact, Mosby's successes were so consistent that, to save face, Union soldiers often accused him of using unfair tactics. The most persistent claim was that Mosby's men fought in Union uniforms. Mosby, however, was insistent that his men wear the full Confederate uniform, complete with insignia of rank.

The real reason for Mosby's success was his tactics and techniques of fighting. First of all, war was not a game to Mosby -- it was a matter of survival. With such serious stakes in the balance, a man could lose not only the "game" but also his life. As he considered athletic competition with its artificial rules a waste of time, Mosby also felt that some traditions in warfare were unnecessarily dangerous. At that time, the standard cavalry weapon was the sabre, but repeating firepower made more sense to Mosby, who felt the sword belonged more to medieval combat than to 19th–century warfare. He urged his men to carry at least two revolvers.

The real proof of fighting was what happened in those few critical seconds when the enemy had either to react or fail to react and be defeated. In these crucial times of cavalry versus cavalry, Mosby's men had an advantage. Mosby's usual order of attack was "Go through them!" Upon the signal, sometimes from the silver whistle Mosby carried on a cord around his neck, all ranger attacks were fast, furious and quickly over. The theory was that the less time spent in contact, the less danger. With reins free and a pistol in each hand, the rangers would put spurs to their horses and charge. With skill, superiority of weapons and determined confidence, Mosby's men seldom met defeat.

Perhaps the greatest example of Mosby's rangers' ability to be flexible and react quickly was the almost disastrous fight at Miskel's farm on April 1, 1863. Mosby and about 65 of his men had stayed at the farm for the night, most of the men sleeping in the barnyard with their horses. About dawn, when most of the horses were unsaddled and eating, 200 Union soldiers of the Vermont cavalry were upon them, almost before any warning could be given.

Had not a stone wall separated them from the enemy, Mosby's men wouldn't have had enough time to react. But in that short period of time, before the Union cavalry began to pour through the gate in the wall, some of Mosby's men were in the saddle. Mosby, with a smoking revolver in each hand, was still afoot but shooting and yelling for his men to charge. One ranger stopped and gave Mosby his horse, and soon the Union soldiers found to their horror that the Confederates were indeed charging *them,* and many of the Northern soldiers had a stone wall at their backs. Before the Union soldiers were close enough to use their sabres, Mosby's men were emptying saddles with their revolvers, and the attack became a panic–stricken rout. Mosby's philosophy was never to stand and receive an attack, but to be always on the offensive. His reaction at Miskel Farm was almost reflexive.

When the conflict was over, the 65 rangers who had been attacked by a force more than three times their number counted 25 of the enemy dead and wounded, while only one of their number was killed and three wounded. They also took 82 Union prisoners. Had they made the traditional defensive stand at the farmhouse, the results would have been entirely different.

The Miskel farm fight and other operations during the early months of the rangers' operations left a deep impression on the enemy. Tales and rumors about Mosby were widely circulated. They helped him gain a psychological edge in any attack when the enemy thought the attacking force was his rangers. Mosby's name was always connected with ranger raids, and in their minds, many of the enemy usually associated the raid with Mosby's personal leadership of the attack. Mosby used this to his advantage by "dividing himself" with several of his companies and having "Mosby and his rangers" striking at several points miles apart on the same night. Conflicting and confusing reports of these raids helped to diffuse any concentrated attempt to locate him.

Courtesy Special Warfare Museum

An engraving from Harper's Weekly, *Sept. 5, 1863, depicting "Moseby's guerrillas destroying sutler's train."*

Mosby's men also created confusion by vanishing after a raid. Instead of withdrawing as a group in usual military fashion, the rangers suddenly disappeared in all directions. Their escapes were aided by the enemy's extreme fear of being ambushed during pursuit.

Mosby rarely rested for more than one day at a time. As soon as he could find a target, he struck. To reconnoiter he sent individuals out in different directions, sometimes as far as 50 miles. These scouts met him at a designated point. When he decided to attack, he either took troops with him or met them near the target.

An example of the results of these raids was summed up in a

six–month report Mosby made to Lee in 1864. With a loss of little more than 20 men, Mosby killed, wounded or captured 1,200 Union soldiers and captured 1,600 horses and mules, 230 beef cattle and 85 wagons and ambulances. Lee's major criticism, however, was that Mosby was attacking wagon trains instead of railroad trains that carried more military supplies. Afterward the rangers did considerable damage to rail transportation.

One such raid resulted in the capture of a $170,000 Union payroll. According to the Partisan Ranger Act, Mosby's men were entitled to keep the money. Except for horses needed for combat, Mosby never took any of the spoils, and he encouraged his officers to do likewise. The money was divided among the men.

Civilian support

No matter how skilled the rangers were, if the civilians of the area had been hostile, the rangers would have soon been starved into submission or betrayed to the enemy. Mosby's first act was an effort to win public confidence. Instead of raiding a nearby Union camp, he attacked a robber band. Within the next few months, the rangers became not only a military unit but a peacekeeping force. Mosby employed his legal background, and horse and cattle thieves were brought before him for trial. House burners apprehended in the act of firing a Southern home received their judgement on the spot, and few were ever brought in alive.

The rangers also shared captured supplies and medicine with civilians in need. By having trustworthy, disciplined soldiers in his command who acted as protectors and providers, Mosby did indeed win popular support. The people of "Mosby's Confederacy" in turn aided the rangers. Today's guerrilla–warfare textbooks call this support network an auxiliary. Its importance cannot be overemphasized.

Local sympathizers provided the rangers with refuge and intelligence. On several occasions, at great personal danger, civilians traveled long distances to warn Mosby of an impending attack. Even the Quakers, who were opposed to war, gave Mosby's men shelter and helped them elude capture. One great ally –– especially considering the Northern mind –– was the many Negroes who gave the Union false information and otherwise helped the rangers escape.

Conclusion

The rangers were neither cold–blooded killers nor impersonal fighting machines. They experienced fear, hunger, illness, anxiety, enemy fire, and fatigue. What kept them going was discipline, success, a certain amount of patriotism and Mosby's leadership. He led by example; his operations were well planned, and his physical courage was legendary. He also had the moral courage to enforce high standards upon his men and himself.

"The military value of a partisan's work is not the number of men killed or captured, but the number he keeps watching. Every soldier withdrawn from the front to guard the rear of an army is so much taken from its fighting strength." ––Mosby

Unconventional soldiers require self discipline. Storm–trooping automatons are useless in guerrilla warfare. Mosby wanted men who could think and fight on their own. He provides a sterling example to serious students of unconventional warfare. His strategy was best expressed by himself:

"As a line is only as strong as its weakest point, it was necessary for it to be stronger than I was at every point in order to resist my attacks...To destroy supply trains, to break up means of conveying intelligence and thus isolating an army from its base, as well as different corps from each other, to confuse plans by capturing dispatches are the objects of partisan warfare...The military value of a partisan's work is not the number of men killed or captured, but the number he keeps watching. Every soldier withdrawn from the front to guard the rear of an army is so much taken from its fighting strength."

The largest force Mosby ever employed was 350 men. Yet some historians estimate he neutralized 50,000 enemy soldiers. By anyone's criteria, John Singleton Mosby was an outstanding partisan warrior.



James J. Worsham is a former enlisted soldier who served in infantry and military intelligence units. He holds master's degrees in history and journalism from the University of Alabama and is currently public relations director and assistant professor of history at Bluefield State College, Bluefield, W.Va.

Maj. R.B. Anderson enlisted in the Army in 1967 and served in Vietnam as a patrol leader in Company C (Rangers), 75th Infantry (Airborne) and as a squad leader in the Aero Rifle Platoon of C Troop, 7/17th Air Cavalry. He has served in a variety of command and staff assignments, including serving as the executive officer of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group. He is currently attending the Armed Forces Staff College.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

CMF 18 soldiers lead Army in 1988 E–8 selection rate

Once again CMF 18 did well on the calendar year 88 promotion board, leading the Army with an overall selection rate of 80.9 percent. Of 236 SF NCOs considered, 191 were selected for promotion. A sampling of other CMF selection rates follows:

CMF 11 – 9.7 percent
CMF 12 – 11.9 percent
CMF 13 – 10.9 percent
CMF 19 – 13.8 percent
CMF 31 – 17.4 percent
CMF 91 – 12 percent

The overall Army selection rate was 12.9 percent. The average time in service for SF soldiers promoted in the primary zone was 15.7 years, while the secondary zone was 13.7 years. The Army averages for the primary and secondary zones were 16.9 years and 14.5 years, respectively, supporting a youthful trend for CMF 18 promotions. In fact, for SF NCOs the average age for promotion selection in the primary zone was 35.3 years (secondary – 32.9 years), in comparison to Army averages of 37 and 34.3 years for both zones. The average time in grade for both the primary (5.1 years) and the secondary (4.3 years) zones was in line with the overall Army averages of 5.5 and 4.2 years in grade. The matrix below depicts the breakdown within the CMF by MOS:

	Primary			Secondary			Totals		
MOS	nr zn	nr sel	%	nr zn	nr sel	%	cons	sel	%
18B	56	45	80.4	38	32	84.2	94	77	81.9
18C	14	12	85.7	27	19	70.4	41	31	75.6
18D	15	13	86.7	16	14	87.5	31	27	87.1
18E	33	27	81.8	15	9	60.0	48	36	75.0
18F	13	11	84.6	9	9	100.0	22	20	90.0
Total	131	108	82.4	105	83	79.0	236	191	80.9

Requirements for divers re–emphasized

Soldiers interested in serving in diving positions should review the latest requirements, covered in AR 611–201. Special Forces underwater operations training is given by the SWCS Waterborne Division at Key West, Fla., which teaches three courses: Combat Diver Qualification Course, open to MOSs 18B,C,D,E, F and Z; 11B; 12B and 43E; Combat Diving Supervisor Course, open to MOSs 18B (SFC only) and 18Z; and the Diving Medical Technician Course, open to MOS 18D. In addition to the MOS requirement, applicants for the CDQC must have a physical within one year of the class start date in accordance with AR 40–501, Chapter 5. They must also pass the following swim test: swim 500 meters using a side or breast stroke; swim underwater 25 meters without breaking the surface; tread water for two minutes with hands out of the water; and dive to four meters and retrieve a 20–pound weight. In order to draw $175 per month dive pay, soldiers must occupy diving positions on their unit's TOE or TDA, make monthly dives and requalify every six months. Monthly dives and requalification dives are outlined in AR 611–75. For more information contact CWO2 Bobby Shireman, Special Operations Proponency Office, at AV 239–2415.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Army personnel agency changes name again

The U.S. Total Army Personnel Agency has been renamed the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command. The change became effective Dec. 8, said Lt. Col. Ralph Hinrichs Jr., chief of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, and soldiers may hear the new command variously referred to as USTAPC, TAPC or PERSCOM.

Time for Year Group 83 to choose functional areas

Year Group 83 officers will soon receive information packets on how to indicate their preferences for functional-area designation. Officers can help themselves by making sure their civilian and military education and their grade-point averages are reported accurately in their Official Military Personnel Files. For technically oriented functional areas requiring graduate-level training, the grade-point average is used by the Army to determine whether officers will be funded to attend civilian schooling or even allowed to enter the functional area. When officers receive the packet, they should make a choice and answer the mail, said Lt. Col. Ralph Hinrichs Jr., chief of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Up to four choices are available; all Year Group 82 officers got one of their four choices in 1988, Hinrichs said, but only 44 percent answered the mail. For further information contact Lt. Col. Ralph Hinrichs Jr., Special Operations Proponency Office, AV 239-5559.

Senior raters urged to adopt more credible rating profile

While DA selection boards report that the OER system is still healthy and is providing the information they need for their decisions, a special DA review of all profiles shows that there are still too many senior raters who have developed noncredible profiles. Noncredible profiles are those which, for any grade, have more than 50 percent of the ratings in the top box, or in which the top box is unmistakably the most frequently used. Such raters diminish the value of their input; they lose their credibility and penalize their best officers. TAPC encourages senior raters to take a close look at their profile and, if warranted, adopt a more credible senior rating philosophy.

SF Branch wants to hear from certain officers

The SF Branch would like to hear from officers who:

- Would like to be associate professors of military science beginning in the fall of 1989. There is no requirement to have 48 months on station.
- Belong to year groups 81-79 and are interested in advanced civil schooling for the fall of 1989.
- Speak a foreign language and do not have it on their records. Officers should update their Defense Language Proficiency Test and send it to the Branch.
- Should have a skill 4Y, 4W or 4X on their ORBs but do not.

-- SF Branch, TAPC, AV 221-3175

Advanced schooling available for FA 39 officers

Four officers from Functional Area 39 are currently attending fully funded advanced civil schooling. Officers interested in attending school beginning in September 1989 should contact Capt. Gary Harter, FA 39 assignments officer, at AV 221-3135.

Information for Special Forces Technicians

- As of Nov. 1, 1988, the title Special Operations Technician has been changed to Special Forces Technician.
- Those warrant officers planning to affiliate with the 1st Special Forces Regiment need to be aware that regimental affiliation cannot be done by warrant officers. That may change in the future, but right now it is not possible.
- Now is the time to get records up-to-date at TAPC, including DA photos, officer record briefs and microfiche.
- The Voluntary Indefinite Board will meet in January. Warrant officers in their fifth year of service (or sixth year if they came in as CWO2) will be considered. Conditional Voluntary Indefinite no longer exists.
- The next CWO3 promotion board meets in April. The zone of consideration will probably be only six months again (the CWO2 bubble is still with us). The Regular Army integration board takes place at the same time. Consideration will be automatic for CWO2s being considered for CWO3, but CWO2s below the zone or out of the zone may apply for RA separately and be considered at the same time.
- The criterion for attending the Senior Warrant Officer Training Course (formerly called the Advanced Course) is that you be a promotable CWO2. SWOT is not required until you are being considered for promotion to CWO4. Given that we fully expect more than 20 180As to be selected for promotion by the next board, we expect to conduct the Special Forces Senior Warrant Officer Training Course in July.
- The last CWO3 promotion board selected two 180As in the primary zone and three from below the zone. While the below-zone selection rate might appear low, those three soldiers were three of the 17 selected from the entire Army -- almost 20 percent of the below-zone selectees were 180As.

For further information contact CWO4 John McGuire, warrant officer assignments manager, at AV 221-7841.

FA 39 graduate studies program out for bids

The FA 39 Graduate Studies Program was submitted for bid Dec. 12 to universities offering master's degrees. The program will enroll up to 60 officers per year in a course of study taught on Fort Bragg, N.C., and oriented toward civil affairs or psychological operations. As planned, the program will be made up of three parts. A graduate core for both CA and PSYOP officers will include cross-cultural communications, cultural anthropology, U.S. foreign policy, and quantitative and research methodology. The CA track will cover international economics, public administration and comparative politics. The PSYOP track will include courses in social psychology, marketing and mass communication. The proposed program may be modified based on feedback from the bidding universities. The SWCS anticipates the contract being let in June 1989 and the first course being taught in October 1989. For more information contact Maj. Robert G. Brady, FA 39 manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, AV 239-5559.

SF officers should act as recruiters

The Special Forces Branch at TAPC reminds all SF officers that SF is the only nonaccession, volunteer branch in the Army. This represents a significant challenge, and the Branch encourages every officer to play the part of recruiter. Failure to represent the branch well reflects on the entire branch.

Update

Special Warfare

SWCS fields new waterborne training circular

The SWCS has recently fielded a new waterborne operations manual which includes all forms of waterborne operations.

TC 31–25 replaces the older FM 31–25, *Waterborne Operations*, produced in 1982. The older manual was based on Navy training manuals and concentrated on diving operations, according to MSgt. Fred Bremer, NCOIC of the Waterborne Divison of the Special Operations Advanced Skills Department at Key West, Fla.

The new manual was produced by the Waterborne Division in conjunction with the Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

It contains information on the various forms of waterborne infiltration: diving, rubber boats, kayaks, and surface swimming. It also deals with various supporting systems such as aircraft, helicopters, surface vessels and submarines. It explains mission planning procedures; navigation; environmental factors, open– and closed–circuit scuba systems and diving considerations.

The circular is currently being distributed to field units through normal publication channels. For further information on the circular or its distribution, contact the SWCS Program and Doctrine Management Office at AV 239–7328/9400.

Key West construction may run over budget

A construction project to upgrade the Special Warfare Center and School's waterborne training facilities may run over budget, according to current design estimates.

The project at Fleming Key, Fla., will include a 180,000–gallon dive tower, barracks, offices, classrooms, dispensary, dining hall, compressor/generator facility, parachute drying tower, boat storage and maintenance facilities, and a covered training area.

The construction will be used for



Photo by Phil Howell

the SWCS's waterborne training courses and will allow the SWCS training facility to move from its current post–World War II buildings on loan from the Navy at the Key West Naval Air Station.

The construction project has been funded by Congress and the design contract has been awarded. The designer's current cost estimates for completion of the project show that it will exceed the budgeted amount, said Maj. Jim Johnson, chief of logistics for the SWCS. Amounts of the budget and the possible excess cannot be revealed while the contract is still subject to bids, Johnson said.

"We are now attempting to find additional funding within Army or joint channels," Johnson said. "We may have to reduce the scope of the project in order to stay within budget."

Another option would be to delay the project until FY 90 or later, Johnson said.

In the meantime, progress on the design has not stopped, and the project could still come in within budget. "As the design is filled out, we'll have a better idea what the actual cost will be," Johnson said.

No construction contract has been awarded so far, but if there are no funding problems, the contract could be let by September and construction begun by October, Johnson said.

SWCS, Navy exchanging diving instructors

The SWCS and the Naval Special Warfare Center have begun a diving–instructor exchange program which emphasizes the joint nature of underwater operations.

Under the program, each service will send three instructors –– two NCOs and one officer –– to serve PCS tours at the other service's underwater operations training base. The exchange was approved by the USSOCOM commander, Gen. James J. Lindsay, in January 1988, according to the SWCS Joint Forces Integration Directorate.

Army instructors will be employed in teaching the Navy's 12–week Basic Underwater Demolitions Course, taught at Coronado, Calif. The Navy instructors will become part of the SWCS cadre at Key West, Fla., which teaches three courses: the Combat Diver Qualification Course, the Combat Diving Supervisor Course and the Diving Medical Technician Course.

Two NCO instructors from the SWCS have already reported to the Naval Special Warfare Center; two Navy NCOs are scheduled to report to Key West in March. Officer instructors are scheduled to be exchanged later this summer.

DCD working on projects for waterborne operations

The SWCS's Directorate of Combat Developments is working on several projects designed to improve existing special operations waterborne equipment.

One DCD project is the improvement of the logistics support for the current Draeger Lar V closed–circuit scuba system. The Lar V currently has limited use because of maintenance problems –– problems it shares with open–circuit scuba equipment. Both types of scuba equipment suffer from a lack of tools, spare parts and maintenance personnel who are trained and oxygen–qualified, according to Maj. Steven Parsons of DCD's Materiel and Logistics Division.

Both open– and closed–circuit scuba equipment were purchased without any sort of maintenance package, Parsons said. Tools, test equipment and spare parts are not included on SOF units' tables of organization and equipment and have to be acquired through local purchase. To add to the problem, units have a shortage of the facilities and trained personnel required to maintain oxygen equipment in accordance with federal, DoD and Navy standards.

As a partial solution to the problem, the Army Troop Support Command is currently preparing maintenance manuals for diving equipment which should be available in about a year, Parsons said. TROSCOM is also attempting to procure spare parts for the open– and closed–circuit systems which should be available in about 18 months.

DCD is working with 1st SOCOM to make changes to the TOE which would allow units to stock tools and spare parts and provide the personnel to man the scuba maintenance facilities, called scuba lockers. DCD is also studying the possibility of developing a separate additional skill

Photo by Al Petersen

Soldier wearing Draeger Lar V

identifier for soldiers trained in maintenance of scuba equipment so that once they are trained, their experience can be used in other similar assignments. The ASI would also serve as a quality control mechanism for scuba–locker personnel. DCD is researching a training program which would take advantage of schools offered by other services and by civilian manufacturers of the equipment.

Problems with the Zodiac F–470 inflatable rubber boat are also under study. Problems soldiers have encountered include the engine transom tearing away from the tubes when using an engine larger than 35 horsepower; flexing of the boat during ocean operations, which reduces the engine's effectiveness; and the failure of the standard 35–horsepower engine to plane the rubber boat when it is fully loaded.

DCD is working with the boat's manufacturer to reinforce the Zodiac's transom so that it will be stronger and will accommodate larger and more numerous engines. It is also evaluating the possibility of using twin 35–horsepower motors to give the boat more power under a full load. DCD may work with the Navy and the Marine Corps to test different boat/engine configurations, Parsons said. It will also continue work to develop a formal maintenance training program and to acquire engine maintenance kits already in the Navy's inventory.

DCD also plans to conduct concept evaluation programs on several other ideas to see if they are practical for special operations waterborne operations, Parsons said. The CEPs include rigid–hull inflatable boats, kayaks, power sources for kayaks, improved buoyancy compensators and fins for surface swimmers, and the use of full face masks and night–vision devices for divers. No date has been set for the evaluations, but it often takes several years between an evaluation and the time the equipment is actually fielded, Parsons said. For further information on waterborne equipment projects, contact Maj. Steven Parsons or SFC Ron Lien at AV 239–1816/4900.

Free–fall parachute offers greater maneuverability

Work is under way on a more maneuverable military free–fall parachute for special operations forces.

The JFK Center and School, the Natick Research Development and Engineering Center and the Army Troop Support Command are developing the Ram Air Parachute System, a technically advanced, ripcord activated system for deployment between 2,000 and 25,000 feet.

The parachute will be especially suited for clandestine infiltration since it will allow special operations soldiers to land together on remote

drop zones prepared to execute their missions. The RAPS can be more accurately guided and can be operated in more severe weather conditions than existing parachutes. It is suitable for both high–altitude low–opening and high–altitude high–opening operations.

The RAPS is a high–glide parachute system with tandem rear–mounted ram–air main and reserve canopies, the reserve mounted above the main. Each rectangular canopy is made of nonporous nylon cloth. The canopies are seven–cell, double surface, air–inflated wings of 375 square feet. The main canopy is deployed by a pilot–chute–assisted deployment bag, initiated either by the manual ripcord or the FF–2 Automatic Opening Device.

Both canopies have a slider with grommets in each corner. The slider retains the canopy in a reefed condition during deployment and allows for a controlled opening with reduced opening force. The main canopy is attached to the harness by a three–ring canopy–release system that can be activated by a single point in the event of a malfunction.

When fielded, the RAPS will be available through normal supply channels for air equipment. Army parachute riggers will be trained to pack and maintain these parachutes. Training on the RAPS will be conducted at the JFKSWCS.

For more information contact MSgt. Mark Russell at AV 239–7007.

Officers given one chance to volunteer for SF branch

Officers considering volunteering for Special Forces must think carefully, since they will get only one chance.

Each year the branch directs its officer recruiting at a specific year group, and that will be those officers' only chance to volunteer. "Officers should realize that it's a critical decision point for them," said Capt. John D. Culp, 18 branch manager in the Special Operations Proponency Office.

As a non–accession branch, SF is open to qualified male volunteers from all the basic branches except aviation, according to Maj. Chip Paxton of the Special Forces Branch at the Total Army Personnel Command. The needs of the Army limit the number of shortage–branch officers who are accepted.

SF currently seeks approximately 130 officers each year from its primary–accession year group to keep up its branch inventory. Once that

U.S. Army photo

year group's inventory is filled, the branch will look to the next year group.

The SF Branch is still accepting applications from year groups 83 and 84, which were left short when the Branch was formed, Culp said.

Officers must apply for the SF branch and be considered by an annual selection board which meets to select the best–qualified volunteers. This year's board will convene in July 1989.

Officers must be selected for promotion to captain to be considered by the board. Those who are other–than–regular–Army must have been approved for retention in career voluntary indefinite status to be considered by the board. Officers need not have been selected for promotion or granted CVI before they apply, Culp said.

If they are selected by the board for SF training and subsequent rebranching, officers will be scheduled to attend the 21–day Special Forces Orientation Course. SFOT is a TDY course designed to ensure that officers are prepared for Special Forces training. Officers must complete SFOT and their advanced course before they PCS for the SF Qualification Course. Only after completing the SFQC will they be rebranched into Special Forces, Paxton said.

Officers selected by the July board will fill school seats in late FY 91 or early FY 92, Paxton said. Deadline for applications is June 2, 1989. For more information on branch accession, contact Maj. Chip Paxton at TAPC, AV 221–3169 or Capt. John Culp, Special Operations Proponency Office, AV 239–2415.

Coordinating draft now out for PSYOP battalion ARTEP

A coordinating draft of the PSYOP battalion ARTEP has been completed at the JFK Center and School and mailed to field units for comment.

Army Training and Evaluation Plans serve as a blueprint for units to test themselves, said Maj. Georgia Bemis, chief of operations in the PSYOP Department, which is assisting the Directorate of Training and Doctrine in developing the ARTEP. It is specifically designed for a unit's missions and equipment and includes the tasks, conditions and standards which are critical to the unit's missions.

The new PSYOP battalion ARTEP will include such recent changes as new PSYOP Group LTOE and battalion organization, Bemis said. Once comments from the field have been incorporated, the ARTEP should be completed by the end of FY 89. For more information contact Maj. Georgia Bemis at AV 236–6088.

SWCS developing PSYOP 'how–to' manual

A new manual under development at the JFK Center and School will provide psychological operations units with more detailed information on techniques and procedures for conducting PSYOP.

The new manual, FM 33–5, *PSYOP Techniques and Procedures*, will be a PSYOP "how–to" manual, according to Maj. Georgia Bemis, chief of operations in the Psychological Operations Department.

In addition to explaining the techniques necessary to perform current PSYOP missions, Bemis said the department will look at the old 33–5, published in 1974, to see which procedures are still applicable today and blend the old and new technologies. A coordinating draft of the new manual is scheduled to go to field units early in FY 90. For further information contact Maj. Georgia Bemis at AV 236–6088.

The previous FM 33–5 was superseded by the 1979 version of FM 33–1, which combined the two manuals into one but was not as thorough. The new manual will provide more detailed instructions on techniques and procedures required in current PSYOP missions. The PSYOP Department also plans to begin revision of FM 33–1 later this year.

SWCS develops automated SOF command–post exercise

The Special Warfare Center and School recently developed the first automated command–post exercise for special operations forces.

The CPX was developed as part of the Special Operations Staff Officer Course, which completed its first regular class Dec. 9.

The eight–week SOSOC is designed for officers in Special Forces, civil affairs and psychological operations who are assigned to SOF unit or staff positions. The command–post exercise is run at the end of the course to allow students to apply their skills in a simulated theater crisis.

Using a new computer program designed for the course, the CPX uses a crisis–action–decision process to simulate the staff planning phase of an operation up to the deployment of SOF units in a theater. It then jumps ahead 45 days, when units are deployed and SOF forces are training host–nation soldiers.

During the CPX, students work under the eye of controllers from various SOF units, including USSOCOM, CENTCOM, the Joint



Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

Chiefs, ASD–SOLIC, the Army War College, the Naval Special Warfare Command and the Naval Special Warfare Center.

The automated SOF CPX will be used for training on three levels, according to Capt. Mike Asimos, CPX manager in the Special Operations and International Studies Department. It will be used in the SOSOC itself, in exercises involving 1st SOCOM and SF group headquarters, and in command–post exercises of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

The SOSOC covers special operations missions, organization and capabilities. Other subjects include the national military command–and–control structure, joint deployment and campaign planning, crisis–action management, the national intelligence system and regional studies.

CA Department to play role in major exercises

The Civil Affairs Department is working to increase civil–affairs participation in major military exercises and training programs.

The department has been successful in the integration of civil affairs units into the Battle Command Training Program, a corps– and division–level staff exercise to identify staffs' weaknesses and strengths to their respective commanders.

BCTP, headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., plans to involve civil–affairs units in future warfighting exercises, said Lt. Col. Larry Wayne, deputy director of the CA Department.

The department also plans to participate in several major exercises within the next year, including Yama Sakura in Japan, Cobra Gold in Southeast Asia, LOGEX in Western Europe and Ulchi Focus Lens in Korea.

Department involvement in these exercises will help to place emphasis on the role of civil affairs in support of the commander, provide civil–affairs guidance and assistance to the exercised unit and assist in the validation of civil–affairs doctrine, Wayne said.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare



The Spy Wore Red: My Adventures as an Undercover Agent in World War II. *By Aline, Countess of Romanones. New York: Random House, 1987. ISBN 0–394–55665–8. 304 pages. $18.95. (Paperback available from Berkley, $4.95.)*

There are dozens if not hundreds of thrilling personal narratives written by veterans of the secret war against Germany and Japan during World War II. Classics like Stanley Moss' *Ill Met by Moonlight* or Peter Churchill's trilogy (*Of Their Own Choice, Duel of Wits* and *The Spirit in the Cage*) have been widely read in the decades since their publication. Many people may not be aware, however, of the number of female agents who were successfully employed in the secret services during World War II –– only a small percentage of them actually served in an operational capacity, but those who did faced the same challenges and hazards as anyone else, and some of them paid the ultimate price. Little has been written about them –– only Margaret L. Rossiter's *Women in the Resistance* comes to mind –– and it is fortunate that Aline Romanones has chosen to tell her story in such an outstanding fashion.

After discussing her desire to be of war service in a casual conversation at a party, the 21–year–old model was puzzled by the events which followed, events which led to her recruitment by the OSS. After hearing that questions had been asked about her and her family at their bank, she received an unusual set of telephone instructions leading to a meeting at a nearby hotel. Following an equally mysterious meeting at a hotel in Washington, D.C., her training began at a remote OSS training camp. Romanones received training in such esoteric skills as housebreaking, picking pockets, demolitions, and marksmanship, and more prosaic lessons in sharpening memory skills and secret communications.

Following her training, Romanones was assigned to the American Oil Mission in Madrid, which served as cover for her actual work in the Secret Intelligence Branch of OSS. Her initial assignment involved counterintelligence in protecting Operation Anvil, the planned allied attempt to open another front in the south of France. She learned just how serious her work would be when she saw an agent knifed in the back in Lisbon while traveling to Madrid.

Even with all her training, the female operative had certain difficulties. Maintaining her cover was not easy while maneuvering through the dizzying social circles she was expected to occupy in wartime Madrid. Several times she risked discovery and almost certain death in carrying out her mission. When her organization's security was breached, she found herself followed by strange cars and stalked by an unknown assassin. Romanones was so successful in accomplishing her assignment that she was kept in Europe as an undercover operative even after the end of the war. She abandoned her career as an intelligence operative to return to Spain and marry the man she had met while on her original assignment in Madrid.

Aline Romanones tells a fascinating story, one which reads better than a great deal of fiction. Her book will serve as a valuable addition to the literature of the secret war in Europe.

Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries. *By Edward E. Rice. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988. ISBN 0–520–06236–1. 186 pages. $18.95.*

Good things come in small packages, and this little book carries weight which belies its small size. The author's service during a 34–year career in the State Department allowed him first–hand experience in the kind of conflict he describes here. Rice was working in China in 1937 when the Japanese invaded. By 1943 he had discovered that reports of Chinese Communist successes against both the invading Japanese and the stay–behind Nationalist Chinese forces were not exaggerated. He remained in China through the Nationalist–Communist civil war, transferring to the Philippines in 1949. There he witnessed the upsurge of the Hukbalahap rebellion, conducted by communist insurgents who had originally organized to fight the Japanese invaders of the Philippines during World War II. He remained in other positions oriented to the Asia–Pacific region well into the period of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. His experiences during this time prompted him to examine what he calls "wars of the third kind," guerrilla wars, as opposed to conventional or nuclear wars.

Rice provides a detailed analysis of how guerrilla warfare comes about, explaining his conclusions through the use of historical examples. His conclusions are few in number, yet well taken. He holds that guerrilla wars are often of a rural and popular nature, arise from fundamental problems and though suppressed, often recur with renewed virulence. They may be carried out with surprisingly little centralized leadership or logistical structure. The ultimate aim of guerrilla forces is protracted warfare leading to favorable intervention by an outside party, erosion of the opposition's will to fight or a complete reversal of the balance of forces between the two sides. The author identifies the fundamental differences between resistance movements and insurgencies and discusses various strategies of counterinsurgency which have been applied through the years. He concludes with an illuminating chapter on the perils of "small wars" for major powers.



The book is well documented by footnotes and includes a useful index. It packs an extraordinary amount of historical experience and analysis into a small package. Though not a complete survey by any means, it is one of the best primers available on insurgency/counterinsurgency theory. It deserves wide readership, especially among conventional officers and the policy makers whose decisions are responsible for the way America prosecutes small wars.

Both the above reviews were written by Fred Fuller, reference librarian for the Special Warfare Center and School's Marquat Memorial Library.

Le Temps Perdu. *By Col. Roger Trinquier. Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1978. ISBN 2–226–00620–6. 442 pages.*

Col. Roger Trinquier's colorful career in the French Colonial Infantry started in the small highland post of Chi Ma, near Lang Son, on the Sino–Vietnamese border, in 1934. He later served at Peking and Shanghai, where as a career Army officer, he remained loyal to Petain throughout the Second World War. Anxious to redeem his loyalty in post–war France, he volunteered for combat duty in Indochina and commanded a company in the first French parachute unit sent to Indochina, the Ponchardier Commando.

After combat in South Vietnam, he was repatriated to France to form the first Colonial Parachute Battalion and returned to South Vietnam to command the 2nd Colonial Paracommando Battalion as a captain. Still later, he returned to North Vietnam to command the Groupment des Commandos Mixtes Aeroportes regional command, and he finished the war as commander of the entire GCMA. This was a guerrilla–warfare and covert–action branch with missions and an organization similar to MACV–SOG.



Repatriated to France, he quickly volunteered for the Algerian War. His first command was the Airborne Base –– North Africa, a combination paratroop school and mobile logistical support base for tactical airborne operations. He moved up to become the 10th Airborne Division's operations officer and played a crucial role in the Battle of Algiers.

Having earned the nickname of "Torturer Trinquier" in the leftist press, he was picked to command the 3rd Colonial Parachute Regiment. Here, he was instrumental in the May 13, 1958 coup that brought de Gaulle to power, despite the fact that he had little use for de Gaulle or de Gaullists.

While in command of the 3rd Colonial Parachute Regiment, he capitalized on his long experience with guerrillas to recruit and train a fifth company of paratroops (each regiment was authorized four line

companies) composed of former Algerian guerrillas captured by the unit on operations. Suspicion of his involvement in the aborted 1961 "Generals Putsch" led to his forced retirement and subsequent service as a mercenary in the Congo.

Le Temps Perdu is Trinquier's best book. Although he is at times pedantic, for he does have some axes to grind, the sheer variety and magnitude of his career afford a valuable and interesting look inside the French colonial army and paratroops at this crucial time in their military history.

Particularly interesting is Trinquier's description of the employment of his unit on pacification and counterguerrilla operations in the Lai Thieu sector. Facing a high command which demanded more and more airborne strike operations, Trinquier noted: "How a unit arrives upon the battlefield is unimportant. What counts is what the unit does when it gets there."

The only disappointing element for the student of special operations is that this book makes only passing reference to Trinquier's GCMA service, where one of his trusted subordinates was a young Meo lieutenant in the French Army named Vang Pao. That story was told in Trinquier's previous book, *Les Maquis d'Indochine*. Despite that shortcoming, Trinquier's account of his experience in wedding the conventional with the unconventional, of complementing regular forces with irregular forces, and balancing success in strike operations with tangible results in pacification make this book well worth the effort for French-speaking special operations soldiers.

Lt. Col. Shaun M. Darragh
Fort Clayton, Panama

Po Zovu Partii (At the Summons of the Party). *By Aleksandr Gromov. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1985. 196 pages. $4.25.*

Soviet military memoirs are closely studied by Western military specialists in order to get a sense of Soviet tactical and operational methods, but insights into Soviet psychological operations are often overlooked in the search for data.

This memoir by Lt. Gen. Aleksandr G. Gromov can help shed light on this rather obscure aspect of Soviet military operations.

At first glance Gromov's memoir seems to be just another Soviet World War II memoir, and one written by an obscure participant at that. The strength of his work lies in his candid discussion of the intangible side of military operations -- the morale and living conditions of Soviet soldiers as well as the impact of enemy propaganda. He also provides an interesting account of how the Soviets organized the consolidation PSYOP campaign in North Korea in 1946-47.

Aleksandr Gromov was a political officer. He started his military career as a simple soldier and retired as a lieutenant general and prominent figure in the Main Political Administration of the Kievan Military District.

Gromov spent most of his early career in the Soviet Far East. In 1939 when Japanese and Soviet forces clashed along the shores of Lake Khalkin Gol', Gromov was a regimental political officer in nearby



Kharbarovsk. With the outbreak of the Second World War, Gromov stayed in the Far East although most of his peers went back to the west to fight the Germans.

The life of a political officer during this period was not easy -- the supply and mail systems had broken down and the Soviet Army was losing on the battlefield. Against this backdrop, Soviet soldiers were being targeted by a Japanese psychological operations campaign: "In those difficult days for our country, when the German fascist army strove for the capital of our homeland -- Moscow -- Japanese propaganda in the Far East tried to sow panic among the local population. They spread rumors of the fact that the days of Soviet power were numbered, that the Germans stood at the gate of the capital and that Hitler planned to parade his army on Red Square on 7 November 1941. It is hard to say by what means, but this evil propaganda seeped into the army."

Indicative of the impact of Japanese PSYOP is the relief Gromov and the others felt when the Soviet Army itself marched in Red Square: "It is impossible in a short exposition to express the boundless joy with which all Far Easterners met the news..."

These passages are suggestive of the collateral effect of a psychological operations campaign. That is, in order to affect soldiers, a PSYOP campaign does not have to target soldiers directly. Indeed a PSYOP campaign may more profitably target the surrounding civilian population. A civilian populace already affected by a PSYOP message will in turn convey the message to the soldiers of the local garrison.

As a political officer, Gromov was responsible for psychological operations directed against newly "conquered" populations. Gromov took the problems of pacification seriously. As the Soviet armies advanced into Manchuria in 1945 in pursuit of the Japanese, the Soviets distributed announcements in Chinese. These announcements

stressed that the Soviets desired to normalize life, i.e., not to interfere in local business, in matters of self-administration or in religious affairs. The Soviets, of course, sought to work closely with local "progressive" forces, but the main burden of pacification seems to have been upon the Soviet military.

The war's end found the 25th Army and Gromov in Korea. In order to reach the populace, the Soviets published a daily newspaper in Korean.

"In the pages of the newspaper, the social-political transformation of North Korea was discussed in an easy, popular form. The work of peoples' committees, the Communist Party, and even the formation of other parties and social organizations was noted. The newspaper published articles about patriots who fought against the Japanese oppression in the underground, about partisan bands, and about people who actively participated in the rebirth of a new Korea."

As a senior political officer, Gromov traveled around Korea checking on the progress of the consolidation PSYOP campaign: "Every day commanders and political workers appeared before various social groups of Koreans; they explained the beneficial goals of the liberation mission of the Red Army and the international situation. They talked about the Soviet Union, its economy and social system. Among the Koreans they found interpreters who worked with great diligence and interest. Local party-political workers, with the help of interpreters, prepared posters in the Korean language, and they hung them in visible places. They distributed leaflets in the Korean language which were prepared by the political administration of the front. Many Koreans came to watch our movies and to look at exhibitions of Red Army art."

As the above passage suggests, responsibility for the PSYOP campaign was split between local political officers who published their own leaflets and the central MPA apparatus at the front level.

In 1947 Gromov left Korea for the Belorussian Military District. At this point, his memoir degenerates; he provides little insight into his climb up the MPA's rank structure to lieutenant general.

The events described in Gromov's memoirs took place 40 years ago. Times have changed; situations have changed. Nevertheless, Gromov's work and others like it are suggestive of how the Soviets view PSYOP today and might employ it in the future.

Capt. Paul H. Vivian
North Carolina National Guard

North Korean Special Forces. *By Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. Boston: Jane's Publishing Co., 1988. ISBN 0-7106-0528-5. 182 pages. $60.*

This small book is packed with a highly authoritative and nearly complete assortment of hard-to-find open-source information on the difficult subject of North Korean special operations. As such, it offers the average reader a best-available insight into the methods, strengths and weaknesses of North Korean special-purpose forces.

Unfortunately, the material covered in the book is somewhat biased and reflects the occasionally alarmist nature of material coming from South Korean sources. The misspelling of classification acronyms associated with some of the declassified U.S. sources (e.g., NORFORN instead of NOFORN) detracts from the aesthetic appeal, and for some readers will hurt the book's credibility. The lack of evidence of close collaboration with Japanese and Korean researchers limits the depth of coverage and leaves out some of the psychological considerations that such collaborators could have lent to the study.

Still, this book is a must for anyone interested in North Korean military or political matters. It would perhaps pay to have it included in the pre-brief for U.S. military personnel deploying to Korea. The book underscores the often-made point that another war in Korea would be, like the first, a war with few or no secure rear areas. The KPA dictum, "One man in the rear of the enemy is worth 10 men before him," sums up the emphasis given special operations in the land of Kim Il-sung.



The author is an analyst at Fort Bragg who wishes to remain anonymous.

Book reviews from readers are welcome and should address subjects of interest to special operations forces. Reviews should be about 400-500 words long (approximately two double-spaced typewritten pages). Include your full name, rank, daytime phone number (preferably AUTOVON) and your mailing address. Send review to: Editor, Special Warfare, *USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.*

Special Warfare

JFK Special Warfare Center and School
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000

PIN: 065228-000